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Abstract 
 
There is a significant disparity between the number of people who could benefit from mental 
health treatment and the number of people who seek mental health treatment. Barriers to 
treatment can include self-reliance and stoicism, a lack of trust for health providers, and, 
importantly, concern for stigma. Mental health self-stigma has been identified as a primary 
factor, yet there is a paucity of research examining self-stigma in context with other explicit and 
implicit influences on the decision-making process involved in a person’s decision to seek 
treatment. In this study, participants sourced from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (n = 150) were 
randomly assigned to one of three study conditions to review and select options for navigating a 
mental health challenge, as well as report on characteristics such as hope, cognitive and 
psychological flexibility, distress tolerance, self-stigma, and situational and dispositional forms 
of rationality and intuition. Self-stigma was observed to have a large and significant association 
with the decision to seek treatment (β = -.494, p < .001). Hope, while not directly related to the 
decision to seek treatment (β = .010, p = .912), was related to other characteristics, such as 
cognitive flexibility (β = .433, p < .001), which did display a significant relationship with stigma 
(β = -.402, p = .001) and facets of distress tolerance. This study reveals hope and cognitive 
flexibility as potential avenues for intervention in an attempt to address stigma and promote 
mental health treatment.  
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Chapter 1 
Underutilized: A review of the impact of stigma and decision-making on mental health treatment 
seeking behaviors 
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Abstract 
There is a significant disparity between the number of people who could benefit from mental 
health treatment and the number of people who seek mental health treatment. Barriers to 
treatment can include self-reliance and stoicism, a lack of trust for health providers, and, 
importantly, concern for stigma. While stigma is implicated as an important factor in the 
outcome of an individual’s decision to seek treatment, its role in the decision-making process is 
not established. Making a decision often involves at least one of two processes: rationality and 
intuition. Each approach to decision-making may be more useful than the other dependent upon 
the nature of the situation. While a balance in rationality and intuition is encouraged, the 
decision-making process is subject to more influences, often unnoticed, than the observable 
characteristics of the options and context presented. One such influence is that of expected or 
anticipated outcome. It is not documented in the literature how these dynamics may interact with 
one another to inform and influence the decision to seek mental health treatment; therefore, 
research is needed to explore the role of stigma in the decision-making process and to better 
understand explicit and implicit influences on the choice to seek mental health treatment.   
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Underutilized: A review of the impact of stigma and decision-making on mental health treatment 
seeking behaviors 
Mental health concerns are a worldwide reality. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
has reported that an estimated 350 million people are challenged with symptoms of depression 
(WHO, 2012). Unipolar depression, which represented the third leading cause of disease burden 
in 2004, is projected to be the number one disease burden by the year 2030 (WHO, 2008). An 
examination of the prevalence of mental health concerns in United States college students 
revealed that 30% to 45% of college students in a non-clinical sample experienced some form of 
mental health concern within the last year (American College Health Association, 2013). Despite 
the prevalence of mental health concerns and the estimated burden it imposes on society at large, 
mental health treatment services are vastly underutilized.  
Wang et al. (2005) revealed that less than half of individuals in the United States who 
may benefit from mental health treatment actually seek it out. Older adults demonstrate a 
preference for speaking with friends and family or discussing their concerns with a primary care 
physician before seeking consultation with a qualified mental health professional (Kim, Cho, 
Park, & Park, 2015; Mackenzie, Gekowski, & Knox, 2006). Meanwhile, younger adults have 
demonstrated a higher likelihood of seeking mental health treatment (Kim et al., 2015). In a 
college sample, however, less than half of those experiencing challenges were estimated to 
utilize services, even when services were made available on campus (Eisenberg, Hunt, & Speer, 
2013).  
Blanco et al. (2008) observed that less than 25% of college students meeting mood 
disorder diagnostic criteria take action to seek out mental health care. International students are 
less likely to access mental health services as compared to those students who are citizens even 
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though need estimates are higher for this population (Mori, 2000). Investigations of differential 
use within cultural groups reveal that usage as low as 17.4% as has been observed in some Asian 
American communities (Kim et al., 2015). Rather than being an issue of access, Kim and Zane 
(2016) reported that the low rate of treatment utilization was linked with lower intentions to seek 
help, all of this despite higher rates of distress when compared with people identified as White.    
Barriers to Treatment 
When considering the disparity between the need for treatment and the rates of service 
utilization, attitude toward seeking mental health services is important. More favorable attitudes, 
however, do not consistently predict higher levels of treatment utilization (Mackenzie, 
Gekowski, & Knox, 2006). An investigation into barriers to mental health treatment on college 
campuses noted systemic impediments including cost, location of services, and of awareness of 
resources (Marsh & Wilcoxon, 2015). Culture has been hypothesized as another important 
influence, as cultures hold differing attitudes toward the appropriateness and perceived benefit of 
mental health services, psychotherapy in particular (Kim & Zane, 2016). Values and beliefs may 
directly conflict with the United States concept of mental health (Mori, 2000), which could offer 
some explanation for the observation that level of acculturation is associated with higher levels 
of treatment engagement (Han & Pong, 2015). Within and beyond culture, Fischer et al. (2016) 
identified four primary attitudinal barriers to treatment seeking behaviors: self-reliance, stoicism, 
lack of trust, and concern for stigma.  
 Self-reliance and stoicism. Strict adherence to masculine ideology and traditional values 
can negatively impact attitudes toward mental health treatment. Therapeutic interventions that 
attempt to target emotion may not be as helpful for people who possess such ideology and values 
due to fear of intimacy and challenges in identifying emotions (Sullivan, Camic, & Brown, 
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2015). Some traditional beliefs hold that immoral thoughts and actions are directly linked with 
mental health concerns (Aubrey, 1991). In order to preserve the reputation of an individual or a 
family, mental health concerns may be denied in the hope that the individual or family will not 
be shamed or ostracized (Flaskerud, 1986).  
Lack of trust. Medical health and mental health treatment are like many other social 
situations and can be subject to cultural mistrust. The mistrust experienced generalizes beyond 
the bounds of the provider and client relationship and impacts the perception of the larger 
treatment community (LaVeist, Isaac, & Williams, 2009; Whaley, 2001). Mistrust can be a 
primary contributor to delays in seeking treatment. Even once services have been engaged, 
mistrust can continue to impact the course of treatment through a failure to attend repeat sessions 
and resistance to adhere to medical advice (LaVeist, Isaac, & Williams, 2009). Due to this 
mistrust, individuals may be more likely to rely on the beliefs inherent to their family system or 
culture, engage more with self-reliance, or subscribe to messages about treatment and mental 
health generated by media, peer perceptions, and religious beliefs. These avenues are potential 
origin points for sigma (Kranke, Guada, Kranke, & Floersch, 2012).  
Concern for stigma. The experience of stigma has been suggested as a primary reason 
for the underutilization of mental health services among Asian American students (Han & Pong, 
2015). The experience of stigma is not limited, however, to cultural minorities. Secrecy and 
shame are common experiences resulting from mental health diagnoses and mental health 
treatment across demographics (Kranke, Floersch, Townsend, & Munson, 2010). Marsh and 
Wilcoxon (2015) suggested that stigma is not a significant impediment to seeking mental health 
treatment; however, it was acknowledged that the literature on the impact of stigma is mixed, in 
part due to challenges in consistently defining stigma across studies.  
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Corrigan (2004) outlined two primary forms of stigma as it relates to mental health 
treatment services. The first is public stigma, which can be understood as the way in which an 
ill-informed public responds to members of the stigmatized group, particularly when prejudices 
about the stigmatized group are endorsed by the responding members of the public. An example 
of this might be when a person who discloses a mental health diagnosis struggles to be hired for 
an employment opportunity because the supervisor is fearful that the applicant will be unstable 
and disruptive to the work environment. The second is self-stigma, which is defined as what 
members of a stigmatized group do to themselves if public stigma becomes internalized. An 
example of this may be a damaged self-concept as a result of being “crazy.” Williams and Polaha 
(2014) extended the literature on stigma by solidifying the dynamic of perceived stigma. 
Perceived stigma can be understood as the expected negative response by members of the public 
and the potential to experience shame and embarrassment due to an individual’s identification 
with a stigmatized group. 
In one study, public stigma was observed to delay treatment seeking behaviors for up to 
83.2% of people in the sample of caretakers and individuals utilizing secondary mental health 
care services (Dockery et al., 2015). At the same time, an awareness of stigma alone is not 
sufficient to generate negative attitudes and subsequent negative impacts for an individual 
(Bathje & Pryor, 2011). While offering some clarity to the observation that stigma is not 
consistently observed as a barrier to treatment (Marsh & Wilcoxon, 2015), this finding lends 
support for findings that suggest that perceived stigma (Golberstein, Eisenberg, & Gollust, 2008) 
and public stigma (Eisenberg, Downs, Golberstein, & Zivin, 2009) may not be the most 
impactful forms of mental health stigma. Instead, when stigma is internalized as self-stigma, it 
begins to have more detrimental impacts on self-esteem, self-concept, and an individual’s rate of 
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service utilization (Bathje & Pryor, 2011; Clement et al., 2014; Eisenberg, Downs, Golberstein, 
& Zivin, 2009; Jennings et al., 2015).  
 In addition to the exhaustive body of literature that has been formed to attempt to 
understand the exact function of stigma (see Jennings et al., 2015) mental health stigma remains 
a complex issue in need of better understanding (Sickel, Seacat, & Nabros, 2014). One example 
of this is that, while public stigma is not as critical of an influence on attitudes toward mental 
health treatment and intentions to seek mental health treatment, it does amplify the presence of 
self-stigma, which is significantly associated to attitudes and intentions (Vogel, Bitman, 
Hammer, & Wade, 2013). This model of public stigma leading to self-stigma about attitudes 
toward mental health concerns has been replicated both in the original population studied and 
across different cultures of the world (Vogel, Strass, Heath, Al-Darmaki, Armstrong, Baptista, 
Brenner, Goncalves, Lannin, Liao, Mackenzie, Mak, Rubin, Topkaya, Wade, Wang, & Zlati, 
2017). Still, most work that is done on mental health stigma remains atheoretical (Sickel, Seacat, 
& Nabros, 2014). Provided that knowing more about the context of the effects of self-stigma will 
facilitate the development of helpful interventions (Vogel et al., 2017), the heretofore unexplored 
context of the degree to which self-stigma is related to the decision-making process utilized by 
an individual when electing to seek, delay, or avoid treatment warrants thorough investigation.   
Decision-Making 
Predominant theories on decision making employ a dual-system understanding of how 
information and cues are recognized, processed, and expressed (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
Stanovich and West (2000) popularized System 1 and System 2 as common points of reference 
for each one of the independent systems within the dual-system approaches. Kahneman (2003) 
presented a comprehensive overview of both System 1 and System 2 and the way in which these 
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systems interact with one another. System 1 can be characterized as fast, automatic, effortless, 
associative, emotional, and habitual. By contrast, System 2 is slow, serial, effortful, controlled, 
and flexible. It is estimated that System 2 can process between 40 and 60 bits of information per 
second. For reference, a random letter of the alphabet will demand approximately five bits. This 
number stands in stark contrast to the combined total capacity of Systems 1 and 2 of 11,200,000 
bits (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
 Epstein (2003, 2010) applied the concepts of System 1 and System 2 in his development 
of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST). In this context, System 1 also is referred to as 
Intuition or Experiential, while System 2 is referred to as Rational or Analytical. Like with 
Kahneman (2003), Experiential is automatic, preconscious, effortless, rapid, concrete, affect-
laden, low in resource demand, and associative in nature. Rational is effortful, conscious, 
abstract, affect-free, high in resource demand, analytic in nature, and based in verbal reasoning. 
As such, Rational demands logical influence that is rooted in how an individual should be, which 
can be challenged by strong, emotion-based motivations presented through Intuition (Epstein, 
2010). Intuition can be trained, particularly when in an environment with stable and regular 
relationships between cues and outcomes that provide an opportunity to learn the underlying 
rules influencing the relationships (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  
 When System 1 processes an object in the environment, thoughts, or perceptions of 
external cues it generates automatic impressions. System 2 interacts with the impressions to 
either express them directly, termed intuitive judgement, or modify them prior to expression. 
Judgements are always intentional and explicit, even if they are never overtly expressed 
(Kahneman, 2003). In contrast to the influence of System 2, System 1 can have influence over 
System 2 without that influence being noticed (Epstein, 2003; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
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While neither system is considered superior over the other (Epstein, 2010), some situations may 
be best suited for either effortful analysis or for intuition (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). For 
other situations, a balance of both System 1 and System 2 may be best (Dijksterhuis & van 
Olden, 2006; Krieshok, Black, & McKay, 2009; Sjoberg, 2003).  
Challenges in Decision-Making 
It is important to note, however, that people’s preferences for one system over another in 
a given situation does not constitute best fit. For instance, when in professional roles, people tend 
to prefer to rely upon System 2; however, observed improvements in judgement only occur when 
intuitive decisions are incorporated (Sjoberg, 2003).  In fact, intuition can be as effective as 
analytical processes even before decision-relevant domain mastery has been achieved (Dane, 
Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). While each system contributes differently to a wide variety of 
situations, neither is immune to flaws (Ariely & Norton, 2010; Epstein, 2010; Sjoberg, 2003). 
Rational processes, in addition to being fragile when challenged by emotion, are rarely 
implemented in actions taken. Generally, people act without dedicated, analytical forethought. At 
the same time, intuition can be irrational and destructive (Epstein, 2010). Another complicating 
factor is that the way in which information is framed matters. Information that is high in 
accessibility in a given situation will bear greater influence over the ultimate decision than will 
information that is not as accessible. This is true even though the most accessible information 
may not always be the most relevant to a good decision for a given situation (Kahneman, 2003).  
 Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) acknowledged that heuristics used to guide judgments 
and behaviors can facilitate complex decisions. A large percentage of decisions are based in 
habit (Wood & Neal, 2007). Habits, though, can be negative when applied to situations that may 
be better suited for critical examination, leading to the perpetuation of bad or meaningless habits. 
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In the case of a meaningless habit, people can spend time engaging mindlessly in habits, even 
when those habits have a high cost, and habitual behavior may not always be representative of 
the “better” preference. Furthermore, choices that appear to reflect an individual’s true 
preference instead may be formed on an arbitrary basis and do not reflect the underlying purpose 
of a given choice. For many different decisions, people engage in careful decision-making 
processes that might include considering pros and cons or identifying different attributes that can 
be compared and contrasted. While systematic consideration can be helpful and improve some 
decisions, thinking can lead to overthinking. People may attempt to consider all attributes present 
in a situation and end up prioritizing attributes that are not genuinely valued by the person. For 
some situations, a systematic decomposition of present attributes is not always possible, such as 
when considering an emotion elicited by a situation or collection of attributes (e.g., the impact of 
seeing the Mona Lisa in person) versus analysis of components that have objective standards 
(e.g., the style of brush stroke used to create the Mona Lisa). Often, individuals are concerned 
more with the decision they can justify to themselves and to others rather than the one that might 
be more beneficial for them in that moment (Ariely & Norton, 2010). Attempting to consider 
each detail of each available option may lead to paralyzing indecision (Fourville & Soman, 
2005) or diminished satisfaction with the final decision (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999).  
 It also is possible that people make decisions based upon information that is attributed to 
one system (i.e., rational beliefs) but in fact originated from the other system (i.e., affect). For 
instance, Andrade and Ariely (2009) discovered that previous affective experiences impacted 
subsequent decisions. The impact of an emotional state endures beyond the original experience 
of the emotional state and transcends the original situation such that it is impactful to decisions 
for which it would be considered incidental. Furthermore, people often will misattribute these 
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effects to their pre-existing beliefs or preferences such that future decisions which evoke similar 
beliefs will resolve in a similar way.  
 Another example of unnoticed influence is explained by Ariely (2010) as relativity. 
People have no internal measure of an object’s value. Thus, relativity is the tendency to compare 
things with one another, particularly things that are easily comparable. In this way, people tend 
to ignore any other thing that is not easily compared. For example, if a person is offered the 
opportunity to travel to Rome (option A) or to Paris (option B) with all expenses paid in either 
case, then which city is selected is often left to pure chance dependent upon the person. When a 
person is offered the opportunity to travel to Rome with all expenses paid (option A), travel to 
Paris with all expenses paid (option B), and travel to Paris with all expenses paid with the 
exception of morning coffee (option B-), then relativity suggests that the individual is more 
likely to select Paris with all expenses paid (option B) even over the option of traveling to Rome 
with all expenses paid (option A). The presence of two easily comparable options, options B and 
B-, means that the option that is not as easily compared to the other two (option A) will be 
selected less frequently. Yet, people do not understand that the mere presence of this third option 
is having an effect at all. They simply assume that the selection they make is founded in genuine 
preferences.  
Affective Forecasting 
When a person is informed prior to an event that the end result may be perceived as 
unpleasant, then they are more likely to agree that the event was unpleasant. This agreement is 
not due to their experience of the event but rather to their expectation of the event before it began 
(Ariely, 2010). Individuals attempt to make predictions about how situations will make them feel 
in response. This process is known as affective forecasting and is often founded in 
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misremembered or insufficient information (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015). In general, people 
are not good at predicting how future situations will make them feel (Hoerger, Chapman, 
Epstein, & Duberstein, 2012; Hoerger, Quirk, Chapman, & Duberstein, 2012; Meyvis, Ratner, & 
Levav, 2010). People’s predictions tend to overestimate the intensity and duration of the 
predicted emotional reaction (Hoerger et al., 2012). These errors are especially likely to occur in 
important situations (Hoerger, Quick, Lucas, & Carr, 2010).  
Errors in affective forecasting can be corrected, however. Improvements in emotional 
intelligence enhance an individual’s accuracy when making affective forecasts, as can the 
development of a strengthened memory for emotional responses to past situations (Hoerger et al., 
2012). Refinement in accurate recall is dependent upon direct, dedicated intervention to improve 
the accuracy in recall of past events. In reality, this type of dedicated intervention rarely occurs. 
When a person experiences an emotional reaction that runs contrary to their affective forecast, 
rather than learn from the experience and make adjustments, the error is likely to persist in 
future, related situations (Meyvis, Ratner, & Levav, 2010). Compounding the inherent errors to 
forecasting, people often do not account for their ability to cope with an emotional response, a 
phenomenon known as immune neglect (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), 
and do not consider the event being forecasted in context with other events that may be occurring 
simultaneously, a phenomenon known as focalism (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & 
Axsom, 2000). All of these errors deepen in complexity when it has been observed that 
individuals experiencing a dysphoric state tend to over-predict negative emotional reactions, 
even in response to positive events (Hoerger et al., 2012). 
Ariely (2010) posited that people are inherently fearful of loss. When a situation arises 
that poses the opportunity to lose something, for example something with respect to a current 
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endowment such as family honor and reputation or beliefs about oneself (Ariely, Hubert, & 
Wertenbroch, 2005; Aubrey, 1991; Bathje & Pryor, 2011), inherent fear may cause potential 
losses to be particularly accessible when considering the ultimate decision, in this case of 
whether or not to engage in mental health treatment. Kahneman (2003) noted that losses that 
could result from a decision will outweigh any potential future state that could result from taking 
the risk and being exposed to the loss. Furthermore, people’s expectations with respect to 
emotional reactions to future events play a role in decisions about health-related behaviors 
(Halpern & Arnold, 2008). When considering the choice of whether or not to engage with mental 
health treatment, a lack of familiarity with counseling translates to increased negative 
expectations for treatment (Mori, 2000).  
Future Directions 
The decision to seek mental health treatment is an important health decision that can be 
influenced by many factors. These factors include the decision-making style most often 
employed or preferred by an individual, the influence of competing options that are presented 
simultaneously to the person selecting the course of care, the uncertainty about what the 
experience of counseling will be like, and the possible impact of self-stigma as a result of 
seeking treatment. To date, there is no available literature that seeks to understand how all of 
these influences combine in a dynamic way to influence the decision-making process of a person 
who could benefit from treatment and is deciding whether or not to seek it out. In order to 
develop meaningful interventions that could attempt to address the underutilization of mental 
health services, the impact and context of these dynamics must be understood. By understanding 
more about what elements influence the decision to seek treatment, as well as characteristics that 
may be altered to facilitate the decision-making process, specific and targeted interventions can 
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begin to be developed that address utilization itself, rather than the competing influences of 
stigma and the decision-making process.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 15 
References 
American College Health Association. (2013). American College Health Association-National 
College Health assessment II: Reference group executive summary fall 2012. Available 
from http://www.acha-ncha.org/survey.html#3 
Andrade, E. B., & Ariely, D. (2009). The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision 
making. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 109, 1-8. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.02.003 
Ariely, D. (2010). Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions. New York, 
NY: Harper Perennial.  
Ariely, D., Huber, J., & Wertenbroch, K. (2005). When do losses loom larger than gains? 
Journal of Marketing Research, 42, 134-138. doi:10.1509/jmkr.42.2.134.62283 
Ariely, D., & Norton, M. I. (2010). From thinking too little to thinking too much: a continuum of 
decision making. WIREs Cognitive Science, 2, 39-46. doi:10.1002/wcs.90 
Aubrey, R. (1991). International students on campus: A chellenge for counselors, medical 
providers, and clinicians. Smith College Studies in Social Work, 62, 20-33. 
doi:10.1080/00377319109516697 
Bathje, G. J., & Pryor, J. B. (2011). The relationships of public and self-stigma to seeking mental 
health services. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 33(2), 161-177. 
doi:10.17744/mehc.33.2.g6320392741604l1 
Blanco, C., Okuda, M., Wright, C., Hasin, D. S., Grant, B. F., Liu, S. M., & Olfson, M. (2008). 
Mental health of college students and their non-college attending peers: Results from the 
National Epidemiologic Study on Alcohol and Related Conditions. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 65, 1429-1437. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.65.12.1429 
 
 16 
Clement, S., Schauman, O., Graham, T., Maggioni, F., Evans-Lacko, S., Bezborodovs, 
N.,…Thornicroft, G. (2015). What is the impact of mental health-related stigma on help-
seeking? A systematic review of quantitative and qualitative studies. Psychological 
Medicine, 45, 11-27. doi:10.1017/S0033291714000129 
Corrigan, P. (2004). How stigma interferes with mental health care. American Psychologist, 59, 
614-625. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.59.7.614 
Dane, E., Rockmann, K. W., & Pratt, M. G. (2012). When should I trust my gut? Linking domain 
expertise to intuitive decision-making effectiveness. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 119, 187-194. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.009 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference 
development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(5), 
586-598. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.586 
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Olden, Z. (2006). On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: 
Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 42, 627-631. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.10.008 
Dockery, L., Jeffery, D., Schauman, O., Williams, P., Farrelly, S., Bonnington, O.,…MIRIAD 
study group. (2015). Stigma- and non-stigma-related treatment barriers to mental 
healthcare reported by service users and caregivers. Psychiatry Research, 228, 612-619. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2015.05.044 
Eisenberg, D., Downs, M. F., Golberstein, E., & Zivin, K. (2009). Stigma and help seeking for 
mental health among college students. Medical Care Research and Review, 66(5), 522-
541. doi:10.1177/1077558709335173 
 
 17 
Eisenberg, D., Hunt, J., & Speer, N. (2013). Mental health in American colleges and universities: 
Variation across student subgroups and across campuses. The Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disorders, 201, 60-67. doi:10.1097/NMD.0b013e31827ab077 
Epstein, S. (2003). Cognitive-experiential self-theory of personality. In T. Millon & M. J. Lerner 
(Eds.), Comprehensive handbook of psychology Vol. 5, Personality and social psychology 
(159-184). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Epstein, S. (2010). Demystifying intuition: What it is, what is does, and how it does it.  
Psychological Inquiry, 21(4), 295-312. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2010.523875 
Fischer, E. P., McSweeney, J. C., Wright, P., Cheney, A., Curran, G. M., Henderson, K., & 
Fortney, J. C. (2016). Overcoming barriers to sustained engagement in mental health 
care: Perspectives of rural veterans and providers. The Journal of Rural Health, 32, 429-
438. doi:10.1111/jrh.12203 
Flaskerud, J. H. (1986). The effects of culture-compatible intervention on the utilization of 
mental health services by minority clients. Community Mental Health Journal, 22, 127-
141. doi:10.1007/BF00754551 
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded 
rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650-669. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.650 
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998). Immune 
neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 75, 617-638. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.617 
Golberstein, E., Eisenberg, D., & Gollust, S. E. (2008). Perceived stigma and mental health care 
seeking. Psychiatric Services, 59(4), 392-399. doi:10.1176/appi.ps.59.4.392 
 
 18 
Gourville, J., & Soman, D. (2005). Overchoice and assortment type: When and why variety 
backfires. Marketing Science, 24(3), 382-395. doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0109 
Halpern, J., & Arnold, R. M. (2008). Affective forecasting: An unrecognized challenge in 
making serious health decisions. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 23, 1708-1712. 
doi:10.1007/s11606-008-0719-5 
Han, M., & Pong, H. (2015). Mental health help-seeking behaviors among Asian American 
community college students: The effect of stigma, cultural barriers, and acculturation. 
Journal of College Student Development, 56(1), 1-14. doi:10.1353/csd.2015.0001 
Hoerger, M., Chapman, B. P., Epstein, R. M., & Duberstein, P. R. (2012). Emotional 
intelligence: A theoretical framework for individual differences in affective forecasting. 
Emotion, 12(4), 716-725. doi:10.1037/a0026724 
Hoerger, M., Quirk, S. W., Chapman, B. P., & Duberstein, P. R. (2012). Affective forecasting 
and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: Evidence for a 
dysphoric forecasting bias. Cognition and Emotion, 26(6), 1098-1106. 
doi:10.1080/02699931.2011.631985 
Hoerger, M., Quirk, S. W., Lucas, R. E., & Carr, T. H. (2010). Cognitive determinants of 
affective forecasting errors. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(5), 365-373. 
doi:10/9607/jdm9607 
Iyengar, S., & Lepper, M. (1999). Rethinking the role of choice: A cultural perspective on 
intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(3), 349-366. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.349 
Jennings, K. S., Cheung, J. H., Britt, T. W., Goguen, K. N., Jeffirs, S. M., Peasley, A. L., & Lee, 
A. C. (2015). How are perceived stigma, self-stigma, and self-reliance related to 
 
 19 
treatment-seeking? A three-path model. Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal, 38(2), 109-
116. doi:10.1037/prj0000138 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. 
American Psychologist, 58(9), 697-720. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697 
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. 
American Psychologist, 64(6), 515-526. doi:10.1037/a0016755 
Kim, J. L., Cho, J., Park, S., & Park, E. (2015). Depression symptom and professional mental 
health service use. BMC Psychiatry, 15, 12. doi:10.1186/s12888-015-0646-z 
Kim, J. E., & Zane, N. (2016). Help-seeking intentions among Asian American and White 
American students in psychological distress: Application of the health belief model. 
Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 22(3), 311-321. 
doi:10.1037/cdp0000056 
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Seymour, E. (1992). Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and subjective 
probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 63(4), 534-544. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.534 
Kranke, D., Floersch, J., Townsend, L., & Munson, M. R. (2010). Stigma experience among 
adolescents taking psychiatric medication. Children and Youth Services Review, 32(4), 
496-505. doi:10.1016/j.childyouth.2009.11.002 
Kranke, D., Guada, J., Kranke, B., & Floersch, J. (2012). What do African American youth with 
a mental illness think about help-seeking and psychiatric medication?: Origins of 
stigmatizing attitudes. Social Work in Mental Health, 10(1), 53-71. 
doi:10.1080/15332985.2011.618076 
 
 20 
Krieshok, T. S., Black, M. D., & McKay, R. A. (2009). Career decision making: The limits of 
rationality and the abundance of non-conscious processes. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior, 75(3), 275-290. doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2009.04.006 
LaVeist, T. A., Isaac, L. A., & Williams, K. P. (2009). Mistrust of health care organizations is 
associated with underutilization of health services. Health Services Research, 44(6), 
2093-2105. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01017.x 
Marsh, C. N., & Wilcoxon, S. A. (2015). Underutilization of mental health services among 
college students: An examination of system-related barriers. Journal of College Student 
Psychotherapy, 29, 227-243. doi:10.1080/87568225.2015.1045783 
Mackenzie, C. S., Gekoski, W. L., & Knox, V. J. (2006). Age, gender, and the underutilization of 
mental health services: The influences of help-seeking attitudes. Aging and Mental 
Health, 10(6), 574-582. doi:10.108013607860600641200 
Meyvis, T., Ratner, R., & Levav, J. (2010). Why don’t we learn to accurately forecast feelings? 
How misremembering our predictions blinds us to past forecasting errors. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 139(4), 579-589. doi:10.1037/a0020285 
Miloyan, B., & Suddendorf, T. (2015). Feelings of the future. Rends in Cognitive Science, 19(4), 
196-200. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.01.008 
Mori, S. C. (2000). Addressing the mental health concerns of international students. Journal of 
Counseling and Development, 78(2), 137-144. doi:10.1002/j.1556-6676.2000.tb02571.x 
Sickel, A. E., Seacat, J. D., & Nabors, N. (2014). Mental health stigma update: A review of 
consequences. Advances sin Mental Health, 12(3), 202-215. 
doi:10.1080/18374905.2014.11081898 
 
 21 
Sjoberg, L. (2003). Intuitive vs. analytical decision making: Which is preferred?. Scandinavian 
Journal of Management, 19, 17-29. doi:10.1016/S0956=5221(01)00041-0 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implication for the 
rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645-665. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00003435 
Sullivan, L., Camic, P. M., & Brown, J. S. L. (2015). Masculinity, alexithymia, and fear of 
intimacy as predictors of UK men’s attitudes towards seeking professional psychological 
help. British Journal of Health Psychology, 20, 194-211. doi:10.1111/bjhp.12089 
Vogel, D. L., Bitman, R. L., Hammer, J. H., & Wade, N. G. (2013). Is stigma internalized? The 
longitudinal impact of public stigma on self-stigma.  Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
60(2), 311-316. doi:10.1037/a0031889 
Vogel., D. L., Strass, H. A., Heath, P. J., Al-Darmaki, F. R., Armstrong, P. I., Baptista, M. 
N.,…Zlati, A. (2017). Stigma of seeking psychological services: Examining college 
students across ten countries/regions. The Counseling Psychologist, 45(2), 170-192. 
doi:10.1177/0011000016671411 
Wang, P. S., Lane, M., Olfson, M., Pincus, H. A., Wells, K.B., & Kessler, R. C. (2005). Twelve-
month use of mental health services in the United States: Results from the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 629-640. 
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.629 
Whaley, A. L. (2001). Cultural mistrust and mental health services for African Americans: A 
review and meta-analysis. The counseling psychologist, 29(4), 513-531. 
doi:10.1177/0011000001294003 
 
 22 
Williams, S. L., & Polaha, J. (2014). Rural parents’ perceived stigma of seeking mental health 
services for their children: Development and evaluation of a new instrument. 
Psychological Assessment, 26(3), 763-773. doi:10.1037/a0036571 
Wilson, T. D., Wheatley, T. P., Meyers, J. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Axsom, D. K. (2000). Focalism: 
A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78, 821-836. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.821 
Wood, W., & Neal, D. (2007). A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. Psychological 
Review, 114(4), 843-863. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.843 
World Health Organization. (2008). The global burden of disease: 2004 update. Available from 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/2004_report_update/en/.  
World Health Organization. (2012). Depression: A global crisis. In WHO Department of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse, Depression: A global public health concern. Geneva: WHO 
Press.  
 
 
  
 
 23 
Chapter 2 
Hope for Treatment: An exploration of stigma, hope, relativity, and the decision to seek mental 
health treatment 
 
Michael S. Ternes, M.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Michael Ternes, Department 
of Educational Psychology, The University of Kansas, 1122 West Campus Road, Joseph R. 
Pearson Hall, Room 621, Lawrence, Kansas 66045 or via email: michael.ternes@ku.edu 
 
 24 
Abstract 
Underutilization of treatment persists despite the growing global impact of depression, 
particularly on college campuses. While there are many influences on the decision to seek mental 
health treatment, mental health self-stigma has been identified as a primary factor. There is a 
paucity of research examining self-stigma in context with other explicit and implicit influences 
on the decision-making process involved in a potential client’s decision about whether or not to 
seek treatment. Other potentially important influences include distress tolerance, cognitive and 
psychological flexibility, and hope. In this study, participants sourced from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (n = 150) were randomly assigned to one of three study conditions to review 
and select options for navigating a mental health challenge, as well as report on characteristics 
such as hope, cognitive and psychological flexibility, distress tolerance, self-stigma, and 
situational and dispositional forms of rationality and intuition. Self-stigma was observed to have 
a large and significant association with the decision to seek mental health treatment (β = -.494, p 
< .001). Hope, while not directly related to the decision to seek mental health treatment (β = 
.010, p = .912), was related to other characteristics, such as cognitive flexibility (β = .433, p < 
.001), that did maintain significant relationships with stigma (β = -.402, p = .001) and facets of 
distress tolerance.  This study reveals hope and cognitive flexibility as potential avenues for 
intervention that could help to address stigma in both direct and indirect ways and encourage 
people to seek mental health treatment.  
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Hope for Treatment: An exploration of stigma, hope, relativity, and the decision to seek mental 
health treatment 
Experiencing a mental health concern can be an isolating and shaming experience 
(Kranke, Floersch, Townsend, & Munson, 2010). This experience is not limited to people who 
have been labeled with diagnoses and provided medication, talk therapy, or some combination of 
the two. In a comprehensive review of college students who were not engaged with mental health 
services, the American College Health Association (2013) noted that up to 45% of college 
students had experienced some form of mental health concern within the past year. These 
students represented a small portion of the global population that struggles with some form of 
mental health concern. When considering just the mental health challenge of depression, it is 
estimated that 350 million people are affected worldwide (World Health Organization, 2012). By 
the year 2030, it is expected that unipolar depression will represent the world’s leading cause of 
disease burden (2008). Students are not alone in the challenges they face with mental health. 
Students also serve as a representative group for the vast underutilization of mental health 
treatment services (American College Health Association, 2013; Eisenberg, Hunt, & Speer, 
2013; Kim, Cho, Park, & Park, 2015; Wang et al., 2005).  
In general, fewer than half of the people who may benefit from mental health services 
take steps to seek out treatment (Wang et al., 2005). While younger generations may be more 
likely to seek mental health treatment than their elders (Kim et al., 2015; Mackenzie, Gekowski, 
& Knox, 2006), fewer than half of the college students who experience mental health challenges 
utilize treatment services, even when those services are made available on campus (American 
College Health Association, 2013; Eisenberg et al., 2013). In an attempt to understand the 
discrepancy between students who struggle with mental health concerns and those who utilize 
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available treatment resources, Marsh and Wilcoxon (2015) explored the potential for systemic 
barriers to mental health on a large United States college campus. Findings suggested that the 
largest systemic barriers to mental health treatment utilization by college students were cost of 
services, the location of available services, and the level of awareness that treatment resources 
were available. 
Mental Health Stigma 
Beyond any systemic barriers found on campus, students also may be challenged by 
barriers inherent to their family systems and communities of origin. Fischer et al. (2016) 
explored attitudinal perspectives that can operate as barriers to mental health treatment and 
identified four primary concerns which included lack of trust and concern for stigma. Lack of 
trust can be personified through cultural mistrust that can present in the relationship between 
therapist and client but also extend beyond the therapeutic relationship to mental health treatment 
overall, or to the larger context of health care (LaVeist, Isaac, & Williams, 2009; Whaley, 2001). 
Stigma can be born of family perspective. Kranke, Guada, Kranke, and Floersch (2012) noted 
that family beliefs, cultural beleifs, an emphasis by the family or community on self-reliance, 
messages from and portrayals by the media, as well as peer perceptions and religious beliefs all 
can influence the perception of mental health concerns and of mental health treatment. Families 
and communities may further complicate views of mental health when they exert pressure on 
their members to conform to common and accepted perspectives. The resulting stigma is a 
critical reason for the lack of engagement with mental health treatment (Han & Pong, 2015).  
Mental health stigma is understood through two primary categories: public stigma and 
self-stigma (Corrigan, 2004). Public stigma is the way in which society responds to individuals 
who possess some attribute that is stigmatized. Public stigma is exemplified when a potential 
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employee discloses a mental health diagnosis to a prospective employer, and the employer deems 
the potential employee a liability and looks to another candidate, even if the diagnosis disclosed 
is common, such as well-managed depression. Self-stigma is the internalized psychological 
impact of public stigma. Self-stigma could be exemplified by the potential employee’s view of 
him- or herself as damaged, unemployable, or less capable (Bathje & Pryor, 2011).  
Clement and colleagues (Clement et al., 2015) sought to explain some of the operational 
mechanisms in the relationship between stigma and mental health treatment. A key component 
that operates to deter treatment seeking is structural stigma which includes the way in which 
mental health is portrayed to the general public, as well as laws, policies, and societal norms that 
disadvantage individuals struggling with mental health concerns. Conceptually, structural stigma 
transitions to a dissonance in how individuals struggling with mental health concerns prefer to 
see themselves and how they are stereotyped or believed to be by society at large. Some 
stereotypes and beliefs include that stigmatized individuals are crazy, weak, dangerous, 
unreliable, spiritually erring, and lack will power. This dissonance mechanism feeds to an 
anticipation or experience of labeling, social judgement, shame, and rejection or discrimination. 
Both the mechanism of dissonance and anticipation, as well as experience, feed to a need or 
preference for non-disclosure. Some consequences of the need or preference for non-disclosure 
are that individuals will attempt to mask symptoms or experience an exacerbation in their 
challenges to open up to a mental health professional. Other, independent elements of structural 
stigma include the inequity in the availability of mental health resources and societal intolerance 
translating to remote, hospital-based options for care. The independent structural stigma 
elements, along with non-disclosure, anticipation, and experience, are conceived as directly 
impacting treatment seeking behaviors.  
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Self-stigma is a primary barrier to treatment (Clement et al., 2015; Eisenberg, Downs, 
Golberstein, & Zivin, 2009; Jennings et al., 2015; Vogel et al., 2017). Despite extensive 
literature which has been dedicated to understanding stigma (Jennings et al., 2015), it remains a 
complex construct that is often explored without guiding principles of theory in place (Sickel, 
Seacat, & Nabros, 2014). While some effort has been undertaken to more clearly understand the 
way in which different forms of stigma interact with one another to affect the behaviors and 
decisions of those who struggle with mental health challenges (see Vogel, Bitman, Hammer, & 
Wade, 2013; Vogel et al., 2013), there is a paucity of research with respect to how mental health 
stigma (in the case of this study self-stigma) interacts with or impacts the decision-making 
process for an individual choosing whether or not to seek out mental health treatment.  
Decision-Making 
Modern theories of decision-making implement a dual-system approach (Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992). System 1, also known as Experiential and Intuition, is associated with learning 
from experience via association, and is characterized as preconscious, fast, automatic, affect-
laden and habitual. System 2, also known as Rational and Analytical, is associated with learning 
through reasoning and logical inference, and is characterized as conscious, slow, effortful, affect-
free, and controlled (Epstein, 2010; Kahneman, 2003). Both Systems 1 and 2 are believed to 
have situations in which one is more functional over the other (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Kahneman & Klein, 2009), though previous research has argued that a 
balanced or integrative approach to decision-making may be best (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 
2006; Krieshok, Black, & McKay, 2009; Sjoberg, 2003). The relationship between System 1 and 
System 2 is complex, however, and decisions that are believed to be conscious and carefully 
regulated may in fact be influenced by factors and phenomena outside of conscious awareness. 
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Kahneman and Klein (2009) noted that individuals skilled at making decisions are often 
unaware of the specific cues that guide their process. Epstein (2010) pointed out that Intuition 
processes can impact Rational processes without the deciding person noticing such an influence. 
People making decisions tend to rely on highly accessible information about a situation, 
regardless of whether or not that information is the most relevant to the determination of a good 
decision for the situation (Kahneman, 2003). A large number of decisions are rooted in habit, 
even if the reinforced habit is unhelpful or irrelevant to the situation. By contrast, when critical 
thought is applied, an individual is often choosing the decision which is justifiable rather than the 
one that is correct for a faced dilemma, or, in an attempt to consider as much information as 
possible, the individual is unable to decide, or experiences diminished satisfaction with the 
ultimate decision (Ariely & Norton, 2010).  
Ariely (2010) highlighted the importance of relativity, a phenomenon that reflects the 
number and characteristics of options presented for a given situation. Because people tend to 
base decisions in highly accessible information, when two options of three presented resemble 
one another (i.e., A and A-), then the decision will most frequently side with the better of the two 
related options (i.e., A), while the outlying option is excluded from the decision process almost 
entirely. This is true even if the decision between two disparate options (i.e., A and B) resulted in 
an event split in decision frequency when the third option (i.e., A-) was not included. Noted, too, 
was the importance of the potential for loss as a result of a decision.  
An individual is anticipating a loss, such as the loss of self-concept (Clement et al., 2015) 
or family status (Flaskerud, 1986) as a result of mental health treatment, may have their decision-
making process further complicated by symptoms of depression and anxiety, which are 
significantly related to levels of self-stigma (Grant, Bruce, & Batterham, 2016). Furthermore, 
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individuals’ perceptions of events can be determined by their expectations for the events rather 
than by their actual experience of the events (Ariely, 2010). Hoerger, Chapman, Epstein, and 
Duberstein (2012) noted that people often allow for their expectations about emotional reactions 
to future events guide critical decisions, such as those about health care. An individual’s decision 
to seek treatment may be one in which potential losses, in combination with anticipated 
emotional reactions to the therapeutic process, influence the decision more than any possible 
positive outcomes for treatment (see Kahneman, 2003). As supported by Dockery and colleagues 
(2015), a lack of familiarity with counseling leads to negative expectations for mental health 
treatment (Mori, 2000). This could culminate in the decision to delay or avoid mental health 
treatment rather than engage for fear of anticipated distress, loss, or self-stigma that could result 
from engaging with treatment.  
Influence of Malleable Characteristics 
 Distress tolerance. Broadly, there two forms of distress tolerance: perceived and 
behavioral. Perceived distress tolerance is an individual’s ability to endure unwanted emotion 
states, while behavioral distress tolerance refers to the individual’s ability to experience 
unwanted internal states elicited by stressors (Leyro, Zvolensky, & Bernstein, 2010). Within 
each domain of distress tolerance, there operate five operationalizations of distress intolerance: 
uncertainty, ambiguity, frustration, negative emotional states, and physical sensations. Buhr and 
Dugas (2002) reported intolerance of uncertainty (IU) as a tendency to react through emotions, 
thoughts, or behavior in response to situations that are not clearly defined with respect to 
expectation or process. MacDonald, Pawluk, Koerner, and Goodwill (2015) extended this by 
clarifying that the uncertainty that triggers such a reaction is in relation to future events. Leyro 
and colleagues (2010) reported a link between IU and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Defined as 
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an inability to tolerate complicated, foreign, or vague situations or stimuli (Furnham & 
Ribchester, 1995), intolerance of ambiguity (IA) is related to behavioral rigidity (Leyro et al., 
2010) and is centered on events in the present rather than in the future (MacDonald et al., 2015). 
Intolerance of frustration (Zvolensky, Vujanovic, Bernstein, & Leyro, 2010), intolerance of 
negative emotion (Simons & Gaher, 2005), and intolerance of physical sensation (Schmidt, 
Richey, & Fitzpatrick, 2009) relate to the inability to withstand aggravation, such as when a goal 
is obstructed, the inability to withstand internal distress, and the inability to navigate physical 
discomfort, respectively.  
Lower levels of distress tolerance lead people to engage in avoidance, while higher levels 
of distress tolerance are thought to lead to more adaptive behaviors (Zvolensky et al., 2010). 
Importantly, IU is a significant predictor of psychological distress within undergraduate college 
students (Lally & Cantillon, 2014). The Ellsberg Paradox shows, however, that people tend to 
prefer certain, or known, probabilities of success over uncertain, or ambiguous, probabilities 
(Viscusi & Chesson, 1999). Dugas, Buhr, and Ladourceur (2004) reported that individuals high 
in distress intolerance, particularly IU, are likely to prefer known negative outcomes to uncertain 
outcomes. A potential protective factor against distress intolerance is psychological mindedness, 
which enables people to integrate multiple pieces of information in order to generate insight 
about their present concerns and situations (Beitel, Ferrer, & Cecero, 2004). 
Flexibility. One method by which people integrate multiple pieces of information to 
formulate an adaptive response is flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is one form of flexibility, 
which refers to the ability to transition cognitive set, thought, or attention to perceive, process, or 
respond to situations in varying ways (Eslinger & Grattam, 1993). These varied responses could 
include the generation of multiple ideas, switching between different types of knowledge, and 
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restraining habitual response in favor of alternatives demanded by shifting environmental 
attributes (Rende, 2000). Cognitive flexibility often is split into two dynamics: spontaneous 
flexibility and reactive flexibility (Eslinger & Grattam, 1993). Spontaneous flexibility is known 
as the ability to generate diverse ideas, consider alternative responses to a situation, and alter 
plans. Two types of spontaneous flexibility include ideational fluency and semantic flexibility 
(Getzels & Jackson, 1962). Ideational fluency is the ability to generate a large quantity of ideas, 
while semantic flexibility refers to the ability to generate diverse ideas with respect to variety, 
quantity, and relevance to a given situation. 
Reactive flexibility, defined as an ability to shift cognition or behavior to suit dynamic 
tasks or situational demands, can be further dissolved to intradimensional and extradimensional 
shifts (Slamecka, 1968). Intradimensional shifts occur when the task relevant characteristics of a 
situation or of stimuli do not change. An example of this might be when an individual follows a 
recipe and measures different types of ingredients. While the ingredients change, as do the 
amounts needed, the act of measuring remains constant. Extradimensional shifts occur when 
previously irrelevant characteristics of a situation become relevant and demand a conceptual 
change in how a situation or object within the situation is handled. An example of this might be 
when the individual following a recipe needs to transition from measuring a broth to chopping 
carrots to place in the pan with the broth (Rende, 2000). Downes, Roberts, Sahakian, Evenden, 
Morris, and Robbins (1989) noted that intradimensional shifts are easier to achieve than are 
extradimensional shifts regardless of cognitive capacity or functioning. Another example of 
extradimensional shift may be an individual’s need to engage with mental health treatment 
services when encountering a period of heightened distress or a depressive episode, rather than 
continuing in habitual behavior. Rather than make this adaptive decision, many people may 
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respond with behavioral rigidity and avoidance in periods of limited flexibility exacerbated by 
elevated distress (Silberstein, Tirch, Leahy, & MicGinn, 2012; Stevens, 1993/1994; Yakhnich & 
Ben-Zur, 2008). 
Psychological flexibility is second form of flexibility that can be related to adaptive 
responses and acceptance (Silberstein et al., 2012; Whiting, Deane, Simpson, McLeod, & 
Ciarrochi, 2015; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008). Psychological flexibility is comprised of six core 
processes that are represented through a hexagon, known as the hexiflex. These six processes are 
categorized into two domains: behavior change processes and mindfulness processes. Behavior 
change processes include contact with the present moment, acceptance, and values. Mindfulness 
processes include defusion, self-as-context, and committed action (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Lower levels of psychological flexibility, also known as inflexibility, 
often are linked with experiential avoidance, which represents active attempts to alter internal 
and external experiences that translate to unwanted and difficult thoughts and emotions (Whiting 
et al., 2015). There are a number of mental health concerns that generate higher levels of 
inflexibility.  
Whiting et al. (2015) noted that, conceptually, psychological flexibility and cognitive 
flexibility demonstrate considerable overlap. Preliminary evidence suggests that neurological 
functioning captured and linked with both forms of flexibility demonstrate significant similarity. 
Furthermore, when cognitive flexibility is reduced to a form interpretable by self-report 
instruments, the instruments demonstrate considerable overlap. Low levels of either form of 
flexibility portend challenges with mental health and reduced efficacy of mental health 
treatment; furthermore, behavior change is central to each construct. The extent to which the two 
forms of flexibility represent identical or overlapping constructs deserves attention. Provided 
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significant relationships between flexibility and elements of distress tolerance (such as tolerance 
for ambiguity; Silberstein et al., 2012; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008), it may be an important 
factor in how individuals consider the option to pursue mental health treatment. Flexibility also 
is represented in Snyder’s (2002; Snyder, Harris, Anderson, Holeran, Irving, Sigmon, 
Yoshinobu, Gibb, Langelle, & Harney, 1991) cognitive theory of Hope.  
Hope. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) challenged psychologists to turn their 
focus to engendering more meaningful and productive lives and cultivating strengths as a way to 
prevent mental health concerns and understand the nature of characteristics that offer some 
buffer against the development of mental health challenges. One construct that offers a buffer 
against mental health challenges is hope. While many different conceptualizations of hope have 
long existed in medicine and other fields and in both emotional and cognitive contexts (Lopez, 
Snyder, & Pedrotti, 2003), hope or hope theory, as it came to be defined by Snyder and 
colleagues (Snyder et al., 1991) was, at its core, a way of thinking (Snyder, 2002). Hope was, 
and is, a belief in one’s ability to generate and follow pathways to an identified goal. Hope also 
was, and is, a way to cultivate well-being and drive emotions (Snyder, Rand, & Sigmon, 2002). 
Hope, in this form, is understood through three primary components: goals, pathways thinking, 
and agency thinking.  
Snyder (2002) detailed the nature of goals within hope theory noting that this component 
of hope is founded in the premise that human behavior is goal directed. There can be two main 
types of goals. The first type of goal is one in which something is intended to be attained for the 
first time, maintained after initial attainment, or extended beyond the success of attainment. The 
second type of goal is one in which negative outcomes are deterred or prevented before fully 
developing. Pathways thinking represents the generation of different routes by which to attain the 
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identified goal (Lopez et al., 2003). Due to this ability to generate multiple alternative routes to 
goal achievement, particularly when some impediment is encountered, high-hope individuals are 
labeled as flexible thinkers (Snyder, 2002). More than an ability to employ flexibility to goal 
driven action, pathways thinking also accounts for the confidence one has in their initially 
identified route, particularly in individuals who are identified as high in hope. Because of this 
increased confidence, high-hope individuals, as compared to low-hope individuals, tend to 
display more decisiveness in their actions and chosen approaches to goal pursuit. Agency 
thinking is the motivational aspect of hope theory (Lopez et al., 2003). This aspect is comprised 
of self-referential thinking that represents one’s belief in their ability to begin utilizing and 
continue utilizing a chosen pathway (Snyder, 2002). Agency thinking is identified as the 
component of hope theory that allows for people to switch to alternative pathways when the 
initial route to goal achievement is impeded in some way. Importantly, agency thinking is the 
means by which people see themselves as active agents of change.  
Hope theory has been linked to multiple benefits across several disciplines (Snyder, 
2000; 2002). In education, level of hope has been linked to academic performance. High-hope 
athletes tend to perform better than their low-hope counterparts. High levels of hope have also 
been indicated in improved adaptability and psychological well-being. While psychological 
adjustment is likely a powerful component of any buffering effect hope might have, prevention is 
not always possible, thus Snyder (2000) pointed to evidence that hope might be a way to foster 
treatment adherence and facilitate psychotherapeutic change. It also was noted that the full 
potential of hope within the context of psychotherapy is yet to be understood (Snyder, 2000; 
2002). Lopez (2013) further highlighted the impact of hope within multiple areas of society at 
large and in a range of age levels. Both Snyder (2002) and Lopez (2013) emphasized the 
 
 36 
importance of cultivating hope. Given hope’s relationship to flexible thinking (Snyder, 2002) and 
the preliminary discoveries in the relationship between flexibility and distress tolerance 
(Silberstein et al., 2012; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008), hope could be a critical point of 
intervention by which to engender increased flexibility, improved distress tolerance, and higher 
rates of treatment engagement by individuals with the greatest potential to benefit from mental 
health treatment.  
Present Study 
In addition to questions about the way in which self-stigma interacts with the decision-
making process about engaging with, delaying, or avoiding mental health treatment, there is a 
dearth of research into the way in which distress tolerance can be functional within the process 
and experience of psychotherapy (Leyro et al., 2010; Zvolensky et al., 2010).  Zvolensky and 
colleagues noted that the relationship between distress tolerance and acceptance also is unclear 
but warrants dedicated exploration. Furthermore, the way in which a positive psychological 
construct, such as hope, can influence the decision to seek treatment while providing a buffer 
again the presence of self-stigma is unclear; though given hope’s relationship to treatment 
process and outcome (Snyder, 2000), it deserves investigation as a potentially critical component 
and opportunity for intervention to engage individuals in treatment who may need it the most.  
This study seeks to explore whether or not relativity, as described by Ariely (2010), is a 
primary influence over an individual’s decision to seek mental health treatment. Is it possible 
that malleable characteristics such as self-stigma, hope, and distress intolerance will override the 
influence of the relativity phenomenon? While there is a building body of literature exploring the 
intolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity as primary influences on the decision-making process, 
perhaps other facets of distress intolerance merit equal attention. Will the characterization of 
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people high in hope as flexible thinkers (Snyder, 2002) translate to an observable influence of 
hope on flexibility constructs such as psychological flexibility and cognitive flexibility? How 
much would a person’s utilization of intuitive or rational processes depend upon their general 
disposition for utilization of either process and to what degree are other situational factors such 
as stigma or hope responsible for situational implementation? Is the decision to seek mental 
health treatment a decision best suited for intuition or analysis? Perhaps, as has been suggested 
by previous research, the best decisional approach is a balance of contribution by both intuition 
and rational processes (see Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Krieshok, Black, & McKay, 2009; 
Sjoberg, 2003).  
Method 
Participants  
To be included in the study, participants were required to be at least 18-years-old, 
enrolled at a university or college in the United States, and living on their college or university 
campus. In total, 962 participants accessed the study link posted to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk). Of those individuals, 363 responded to at least one item but did not complete the 
survey or did not submit their completion code to the mTurk system. Another 299 individuals 
were screened out by the three screening items included at the beginning of the survey. To 
confirm that respondents were living on their campus in the United States, the geolocations of 
respondents were verified via the geolocation assigned to responses in Qualtrics. Of those who 
completed the survey and submitted their link to mTurk, 140 were not located in the United 
States and were subsequently excluded from the study. Random responding (e.g., responding “1” 
to every item or alternating between the top two options throughout the survey) led to the 
exclusion of 10 additional participants.  
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The final sample was comprised of 150 respondents (see Table 1). The majority of the 
sample identified as male (n = 91, 60.7%) and 0.7% of the sample identified as Non-Binary. 
With respect to racial identity, 68% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian with 16 
individuals identifying as Asian American, 18 as African American, 11 as Latino/Latina/Latinx, 
two as Native American, and one identifying as “Other” and declining to specify. The majority 
of participants (n = 120, 80%) were enrolled at their college or university full-time. Only 10 
respondents were Freshmen, the bulk of participants (n = 115, 76.6%) were Juniors, Seniors, or 
Graduate Students. Also notable is that 31.3% of the sample was employed full-time, while 
17.3% were unemployed, and 51.3% held part-time work. A total of 69 individuals (46%) 
identified as first-generation students.  
Pursuant to standards outlined by MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996), a power 
analysis was performed with the assistance of online software “Computing Power and Minimum 
Sample Size for RMSEA” made available through quantpsy.org (Preacher & Coffman, 2006). 
This software was used to generate code that was then executed through the open-source 
statistical software RStudio. When considering the model to be estimated (df = 49), results 
demonstrated that the minimum sample size needed to assess model fit, when RMSEA null ≤ .05 
and RMSEA alternative ≥ .08; α = 0.05; and desired power (1 - β) is .80, is 216.41 participants.    
Materials 
 Demographics Questionnaire and Vignette. All participants were tasked with 
completing a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix A). The questionnaire included topics 
such as age, year in school, student status, worker status, relationship status, first-generation 
status, racial identity, gender identity, whether or not the participant has previously engaged in 
treatment with a qualified mental health professional (QMHP), whether or not the interaction 
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with the QMHP was helpful, whether or not the participant is currently engaged in treatment 
with a QMHP, and whether or not the participant finds their current interactions with a QMHP 
helpful. Not all of these characteristics are incorporated in the analysis for this study.  
All participants were then exposed to a standardized vignette (see Appendix B). Hughes 
and Huby (2004) noted that vignettes can be appropriate for social science provided the validity 
of the vignette implemented and the purpose and context in which it is being utilized. Vignettes 
have been demonstrated as effective tools for inducing affective states (Zhang, Yu, & Barrett, 
2014) and exploring a participant’s thought process relative to elements of a specific situation 
(Evans et al., 2015).  
The vignette used in this study was designed in accordance with standards outlined by 
Evans and colleagues (2015) and which characterized a person actively struggling with 
symptoms of depression. Following the vignette, participants were encouraged to imagine 
themselves in the position of the individual described in the vignette, with the vignette available 
for reference should participants wish to re-read it. Participants were then, dependent upon study 
condition, asked to select from no options, two options (active engagement with avoidance 
strategies that require no monetary investment versus active engagement with a qualified mental 
health professional that requires no monetary investment), or three options (the same two options 
stated previously and active engagement with a family member or friend, requiring no monetary 
investment). In all instances participants were asked to rate how likely they would be to engage 
with a QMHP using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely).  
In order to establish the validity of the vignette, it was reviewed by seven Psychologists 
in university counseling center, private practice, academic appointment, and VA medical center 
settings. All reviews agreed that the vignette was an accurate depiction of a person with 
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depression and believe that the average person would recognize the struggle in the vignette as 
depression. The implementation of the vignette was mostly successful with 89% of mTurk 
respondents recognizing the person described in the vignette as depressed.  
Rational Experiential Inventory-Revised (REI). The REI and the REI-Revised, 
referred to as the REI, were measures created by Pacini and Epstein (1999) that provided a 
metric for an individual’s characteristic utilization, or disposition, of System 1 and System 2 
when making decisions. The revised measure consists of 40 Likert-type items scored on a scale 
from 1 (Definitely not true of myself) to 5 (Definitely true of myself) and is freely available for 
use in instruction and research. Example items include “I try to avoid situations that require 
thinking in depth about something,” and “I have a logical mind.” The REI demonstrated 
exceptional internal reliability with a total score reliability of .90 for the Rational Scale and .87 
for the Experiential Scale. Each subscale consisted of two 10-item scales. Rational was broken 
into Rational Ability and Rational Engagement. Experiential Ability and Experiential 
Engagement comprised the Experiential scale. Support for construct validity was garnered with 
analysis indicating an orthogonal, two-factor structure as the most appropriate for the given 
items. Each subscale demonstrated unique predictive validity to other constructs such as 
personality as conceptualized through the Big Five model. Evidence also was observed in 
support of discriminant validity.  
In this study, the two-factor, orthogonal structure was not replicated (χ2(740) = 1629.654, 
p < .001, CFI = .640, TLI = .621, RMSEA = .090 (.084 - .095), SRMR = .145). Even after 
extensive modifications to account for covariance between items on the same subscales, the 
model displayed questionable fit (χ2(728) = 1411.026, p < .001, CFI = .724, TLI = .704, RMSEA 
= .079 (.073 - .085), SRMR = .141). The subscales of the REI displayed excellent internal 
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reliability, consistent with the developmental literature, with the Rational scale estimated at .93 
and the Experiential scale estimated at .88.  
Situation-Specific Thinking Style (SSTS). In an effort to develop a version of the REI 
that could be specific to any given situation rather than dispositional in nature, Novak and 
Hoffman (2009) created the SSTS. From an initial item-pool of 53-items, 10-items for a Rational 
scale and 10-itmes for an Experiential scale were chosen through factor analysis. The final form 
of the SSTS is a 20-item scale scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale and is available for use in 
research. Example items include “I reasoned things out carefully,” and “I trusted my hunches.” 
One 10-item subscale measures System 1 thinking (situational intuition) and has demonstrated 
strong internal reliability across two studies (a = .89 and a = .90), and a second 10-item subscale 
measures System 2 thinking (situational rationality) and also has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (a=.90 and a=.92).  Construct validity was observed through the acceptable fit of 
the theorized two-factor structure. Convergent validity was demonstrated in strong correlations 
between each of the sub-scales and tasks known to be associated with either rational or intuitive 
processes. The measure is believed to be an acceptable assessment for observing an individual’s 
decision-making process for specific situations.  
In the present study, the two-factor solution was deemed appropriate and initially 
displayed adequate fit (χ2(170) = 307.099, p < .001, CFI = .901, TLI = .890, RMSEA = .073 
(.062 - .085), SRMR = .091). Two modifications were implemented to account for the 
covariance shared displayed in items six and 10, as well as items 17 and 18. With one 
modification to each of the subscales, the two-factor solution rendered improved yet still 
adequate fit (χ2(168) = 281.716, p < .001, CFI = .918, TLI = .907, RMSEA = .067 (.055 - .079), 
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SRMR = .090). The internal structure of the instrument was observed to be excellent with the 
System 1 subscale estimated at .93 and the System 2 subscale estimated at .92.  
Self-Stigma of Seeking Help Scale (SSOSHS). This measure determines the degree to 
which an individual would stigmatize him or herself as a result of seeking help with mental 
health concerns (Wade, & Haake, 2006). Ten Likert-type items scored on a range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 3 (agree and disagree equally) to 5 (strongly agree) compose the SSOSHS, 
and higher scores indicate a higher level of self-stigma. Example items include “I would feel 
inadequate if I went to a therapist for psychological help,” and “I would feel worse about myself 
if I could not solve my own problems.” This instrument is free for use in instruction and 
research. The instrument has demonstrated strong internal reliability with an estimate of .91. 
Additional support for reliability was observed in a test-retest estimate of .72 when the measure 
was administered again two months after initial administration. Some evidence for criterion 
validity also was provided with a significant negative correlation between the SSOSHS and 
another measure that indicated the participants’ willingness to engage in treatment seeking 
behaviors. 
The single-factor solution for the SSOSHS was, at first, unacceptable (χ2(35) = 132.247, 
p < .001, CFI = .751, TLI = .679, RMSEA = .136 (.115 - .158), SRMR = .114). Several 
modifications were explored resulting in the modeling of covariance between item two and items 
five and nine, between items one and three, between item nine and items five and 10, and 
between item seven and items nine, four, and five. The resulting model displayed good fit (χ2(27) 
= 45.833, p = .013, CFI = .952, TLI = .920, RMSEA = .068 (.036 - .098), SRMR = .071). An 
estimate of Cronbach’s Alpha indicated that the SSOSHS is reliable (a = .84).  
Adult Hope Scale (AHS). The AHS was designed to indicate an individual’s level of 
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hope (Snyder et al., 1991) and is free for use in instruction and research. The instrument is 
comprised of 12 Likert-type items scored on an eight-point scale including the anchors 
1(definitely false) and 8 (definitely true). Two, four-item subscales explore pathways thinking 
and agency thinking. The final four-items are distractor items. Example items include “I can 
think of many ways to get out of a jam,” “My past experiences have prepared me well for my 
future,” and “I am easily downed in an argument.” Internal reliability for the AHS is good with 
estimates ranging from .74 to .84. Test-retest reliability for the total score is .80 or higher (Lopez 
et al., 2003). Extensive utilization of the AHS has gathered support for predictive, convergent, 
and discriminant validity (Lopez et al., 2003; Snyder, 2002).   
In this study, internal reliability of each of the subscales was good with pathways 
thinking and agency thinking both estimated at .85. The total score for the scale displayed 
excellent internal reliability (a = .91). An examination of the factor structure yielded perfect fit 
when the model accounted for the presence of two subscales influenced by a higher-order factor 
of hope (χ2(12) = 11.713, p = .469, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.002, RMSEA = .000 (.000 - .071), 
SRMR = .022). 
Distress Intolerance Five Factor-Short (DIS). Pursuant to a more comprehensive 
conceptualization of distress outlined in Zvolensky and colleagues (2010), Bardeen, Fergus, and 
Orcutt (2013) conducted a hierarchical analysis of some of the most widely used measures for 
the five components of distress. In an effort to make a more parsimonious measure, Bebane, 
Flowe, and Maltby (2015) conducted exploratory factor analysis on five measures, consisting of 
over 100 items, to generate this measure of 20 Likert-type items scored on a seven-point scale 
from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree) where higher scores indicate higher levels of 
distress tolerance. This instrument is free for use in instruction and research. Example items 
 
 44 
include “Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad,” “I can’t bear it if other people 
stand in the way of what I want,” “It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a 
simple one,” “I have a high pain tolerance,” and “I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed 
or upset.” While internal reliability estimates were regarded as fair (a = .68-.83) for the 
individual subscales, the bi-factor structure indicated through factor analysis make it a valuable 
tool for research on the proposed five factor model of distress (Zvolensky et al., 2010).   
In this present study, the scoring of the subscales of the DIS was reversed such that 
higher scores indicated greater levels of distress intolerance. A five-factor measurement structure 
initially displayed poor fit (χ2(160) = 326.588, p < .001, CFI = .830, TLI = .798, RMSEA = .083 
(.072 - .095), SRMR = .107). A total of six modifications were implemented to account for 
covariance between item 12 and items nine and 11, between items 13 and 14, between items 15 
and 16, between items three and four, and between items five and six. The resulting model 
displayed adequate fit (χ2(154) = 240.915, p < .001, CFI = .911, TLI = .890, RMSEA = .061 
(.047 - .075), SRMR = .081). The internal reliability of the subscales ranged from .42 to .89. The 
most unreliable subscales were the intolerance of physical discomfort (a = .42) and the 
intolerance of ambiguity (a = .60).  
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI). This measure was designed to examine 
characteristics of cognitive flexibility that are considered essential for engaging in adaptive 
thinking over pre-existing, maladaptive thoughts (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). The measure 
consists of 20 Likert-type items scored on a 7-point scale with anchors at each interval including 
1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) and was used in this study with permission of the 
original authors. Two subscales were indicated by exploratory factor analysis including a 13-
item scale labeled alternatives and a seven-item scale labeled control. Example items include “I 
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like to look at difficult situations from many different angles,” and “I feel I have no power to 
change things in difficult situations.” Internal reliability estimates for each of the two subscales 
are strong with alternatives and control estimated at .91 and .86 respectively and an estimate of 
.90 for the combined total score. Some evidence has been accumulated for construct validity and 
convergent validity. Notably, with respect to convergent validity, the CFI correlated significantly 
with another established measure of cognitive flexibility, but displayed limited correlation, as did 
other self-report measures, with frequently used neuropsychological assessments of cognitive 
flexibility (Johnco, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2014). Burgess and colleagues (2006) noted, however, 
that the commonly used neuropsychological assessments were derived purely from the construct 
and may not be the most accurate representation of the construct. Thus, a self-report measure 
was deemed an appropriate alternative. 
A higher-order factor structure was best fit for this instrument as observed in this study. 
Initially, however, it displayed poor fit (χ2(168) = 344.233, p < .001, CFI = .866, TLI = .848, 
RMSEA = .084 (.072 - .095), SRMR = .118). Covariance modifications were modeled between 
item four and items 15 and 2, between item 16 and items 5 and 18, and between item 14 and 
items 18 and 20. The resulting model displayed adequate fit (χ2(162) = 274.160, p < .001, CFI = 
.915, TLI = .900, RMSEA = .068 (.056 - .080), SRMR = .122). In addition to factor structure, 
internal reliability was estimated. The alternatives subscale (a = .93) and the total score (a = .92) 
each demonstrated excellent internal reliability, while the control subscale demonstrated good 
internal reliability (a = .89). 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II). The AAQ-II was created by Bond 
and colleagues (Bond et al., 2011) as a measure of psychological inflexibility. The measure 
consists of 10 Likert-type items scored on a scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true) and is 
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free for use in instruction and research. Higher scores on the AAQ-II indicate a higher level of 
psychological inflexibility. Example items include “I’m afraid of my feelings,” and “I am in 
control of my life.” The internal reliability estimate is indicative of strong internal structure 
(a=.84) with a test-retest evidence bolstering this indication with an estimate of .81 over a three-
month timespan and .79 over a period of one year. The AAQ-II was designed to be an update of 
the first iteration of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ). Correlation between the 
two (r = .97) indicated that the AAQ-II is measuring the same construct as the AAQ. Evidence 
also was provided for both convergent and discriminant validity.  
For the purposes of this study, the items were reverse scored such that higher scores 
indicated higher levels of psychological flexibility. As observed in this study, the single-factor 
solution for the AAQ-II displayed adequate fit (χ2(35) = 79.482, p < .001, CFI = .909, TLI = 
.884, RMSEA = .073 (.062 - .085), SRMR = .091). One modification was implemented to 
account for the residual covariance between item one and item six. The resulting model 
displayed good fit (χ2(34) = 66.466, p = .001, CFI = .934, TLI = .912, RMSEA = .080 (.054 - 
.105), SRMR = .056). Additionally, the instrument exhibited good internal reliability with a 
Chronbach’s Alpha estimate of .89.  
Design  
 The present study was a quasi-experimental study. The dependent variable was the 
likelihood a person will engage with a qualified mental health professional. While one 
independent variable was manipulated (the number and type of options explicitly presented to 
the participant following the vignette) the other independent variables (hope; System 1 and 
System 2 utilization, dispositional (REI) and situation specific (SSTS); self-stigma; 
psychological flexibility; cognitive flexibility; and the five facets of distress intolerance) were 
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not manipulated and were represented by scores of their associated instruments. The study 
examined the following hypotheses: 
H1: The phenomenon of relativity will not be replicated in this study when options to 
engage with treatment (A, A-, and B) are presented for selection via role induction using 
a standardized vignette.  
H2: A respondent’s likelihood of engaging with mental health treatment (MHT), will 
significantly decrease as options for response to a mental health concern increase. 
H3: All five dimensions of distress intolerance, as represented by scores on each of the 
five subscales of the Distress Intolerance Scale, will have a significantly negative 
relationship with a participant’s likelihood of engaging with MHT. 
H4: IU and IA will be characterized by a significant negative relationship to likelihood of 
engagement with MHT, above and beyond the combined effects of the other three 
dimensions of distress intolerance. 
H5: Self-stigma, as represented by scores on the Self-Stigma of Seeking Help Scale, will 
influence situational observations of System 1 and System 2, as represented by subscale 
scores on the Situation-Specific Thinking Style scale, and a respondent’s likelihood of 
engaging with MHT in a significantly negative way.  
H6: Hope, as represented by a respondent’s score of the Adult Hope Scale, will operate 
as a preventative factor against self-stigma, as evidenced by a significantly negative 
relationship. 
H7: Hope will engender flexibility by holding a significantly positive relationship with 
both psychological flexibility, as represented by scores on the Acceptance and Action 
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Questionnaire-II, and cognitive flexibility, as represented by scores on the Cognitive 
Flexibility Inventory. 
H8: Hope will encourage the balanced utilization of both System 1 and System 2 
processes in the decision to seek MHT, as evidenced by a significantly positive 
relationship with situational observations of Systems 1 and 2.  
H9: Hope will hold a significantly positive relationship with a respondent’s likelihood of 
engaging with MHT.  
H10: The decision to engage with MHT, as represented through a respondent’s rated 
likelihood of engaging with MHT, will be one in which a balanced decision-making 
process is engaged, as evidenced by the lack of a significant difference in the 
relationships between situational observations of System 1and situational observations of 
System 2 and the decision to engage with MHT. 
H11: Observations of situational System 1 and situational System 2 will be influenced 
significantly more by self-stigma and Hope than by dispositional observations of Systems 
1 and 2, as measured by scores on the two subscales of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory. 
H12: Psychological flexibility and cognitive flexibility will be characterized by 
significantly negative relationships with all five facets of distress intolerance.  
H13: Psychological flexibility and cognitive flexibility will be representative of some 
larger construct of flexibility as evidenced by a non-significant difference in each 
construct’s relationship with distress intolerance.  
Procedure 
After obtaining IRB approval, participants were recruited utilizing the online data 
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sourcing service mTurk. The mTurk service has demonstrated its ability to render samples that 
are commensurate to the population of the United States with respect to demographic 
characteristics (Huff & Tingley, 2015). It also has been found to be a source of reliable data 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and can operate as a viable alternative to general 
university and college research participant pools (Behrend, Sharek, & Meade, 2011; Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Through mTurk, participants were directed to a digital version of 
the study’s information statement, study materials, and a debriefing statement all hosted on the 
online survey platform Qualtrics. Prior to beginning the survey, three items were presented to the 
prospective participant: certification of being 18-years-old or older, student status (not a student, 
part-time student, full-time student), and on-campus residence at a university or college in the 
United States. If any of these three criteria are not met (i.e., the prospective participant is 
younger than 18-years-old, not a student, or not living on the campus of their university or 
college), then the prospective participant was directed to a debriefing screen thanking them for 
their interest in the study and providing them a code for reimbursement per the study protocol.  
If a prospective participant met the inclusion criteria, they were randomly assigned to one 
of the three study conditions and directed to the Demographics Questionnaire and the vignette.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (no options from which 
to choose, two options from which to choose, or three options from which to choose) wherein 
they were asked to re-read the standardized vignette and complete the option selection task 
appropriate to their condition, while imagining that they are in the position of the individual 
described in the vignette. All participants were then asked their likelihood of engaging with a 
QMHP. The vignette and related items were followed with the SSTS, SSOSHS, AHS, CFI, 
AAQ-II, and the REI.  
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Upon completion of all tasks, all participants were directed to a debrief message 
reminding the participant that he or she was not the individual depicted in the vignette. While the 
vignette was not expected to incur undue stress, a link to the website for the National Suicide 
Prevention Lifeline, as well as provider locator tools available through the APAPO and 
Psychology Today, and an emergency room locator were provided. Participants were then 
thanked for their time and provided with a code to submit for payment through mTurk. All 
participants were compensated for their time through mTurk from a pool of funds supplied by 
the Principal Investigator with unqualified participants receiving $0.01 and qualified participants 
receiving $1.00 with a bonus of up to $0.30 dependent upon participant performance on 
randomly dispersed attention checks.  
Planned Analyses 
 All analyses requiring the implementation of simulated generalized linear modeling 
through defined parameters within structural equation modeling, as well as structural equation 
modeling were done using the statistics package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) through the open-
sourced software R on the platform RStudio. All other analyses, including demographic analysis, 
were completed utilizing the software SPSS, version 24. Before advanced analyses began, each 
of the three conditions were analyzed to ensure that none of the three groupings differed 
significantly with respect to age, gender identity, racial identity, student status, work status, and 
past and current engagement with a QMHP. For continuous variables, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to see if group means differed across the three conditions. For 
categorical variables, chi-square distribution tests was run to determine if frequency endorsement 
differed across the three conditions. Once all groups were established as equal, each of the 13 
hypotheses were explored.  
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 H1 required a chi-square test in order to determine if frequency endorsement of actively 
engaging with a QMHP significantly differs between the condition in which two options are 
presented as compared with the option in which three options are presented. H1 was to be 
supported if this test was non-significant, indicating that frequency does not differ between the 
two observations. H2 was explored using ANOVA to see if the group means for likelihood of 
seeking mental health treatment differed significantly. This hypothesis would have been partially 
supported if the overall main effect was significant, indicating a significant difference in means 
across groups. Post-hoc testing, using Scheffe’s procedure, would have been implemented to 
observe the specific trend in mean differences across groups. H2 would have been fully 
supported if each addition of options significantly decreases the mean for engaging with a 
QMHP over the previous iteration.    
 H3, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, and H12 all relied upon examination of standardized beta-
weights derived using structural equation modeling to determine the degree of support available. 
H3 would have been supported if standardized beta-weights between all five facets of the distress 
intolerance scale and the likelihood of actively engaging a QMHP are significantly negative. H5 
would have been fully supported if a significantly negative standardized beta-weight were 
observed in the relationship between stigma and the likelihood of actively engaging a QMHP, as 
well as stigma and situational rationality. The observation of a significantly negative 
standardized beta-weight between hope and self-stigma would have offered full support for H6. 
A significantly positive standardized beta-weight between hope and psychological flexibility, 
between hope and cognitive flexibility, between hope and both situational intuition and 
situational rationality, and between hope and the likelihood of actively engaging with a QMHP 
would have provided full support for H7, H8, and H9 respectively. H12 would have been fully 
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supported if both psychological flexibility and cognitive flexibility were characterized by 
significantly negative standardized beta-weights with all five facets of distress intolerance.  
 H4, H10, H11, and H13 all required the simulation of generalized linear modeling 
through parameter definitions established in the structural equation modeling analysis done in 
lavaan. H4 would have been supported if the combined effect of uncertainty and ambiguity 
facets of distress intolerance on the likelihood to actively engage with a QMHP is significantly 
greater than the combined effect of the remaining three facets of distress intolerance on the 
likelihood to actively engage with a QMHP. H10 would have been supported if no statistically 
significant difference had been observed in the contrast of the relationship of situational intuition 
and situational rationality on the likelihood to actively engage with a QMHP. If the combined 
effect of hope and stigma on situational intuition and the situational rationality had been 
significantly larger than the effects of the respective dispositional intuition and dispositional 
rationality, then H11 would have been supported. Finally, if the effects of psychological 
flexibility and cognitive flexibility on the five facets of distress intolerance were not statistically 
different from one another, then H13 would have been supported.    
Results 
Conditions and Vignette 
To examine the equivalence of conditions, demographic characteristics were examined 
for significant differences including age, gender identity, racial identity, enrollment status, year-
standing in school, employment status, past engagement with a QMHP, and current engagement 
with a QMHP. To perform these analyses, variables that were nominal, such as gender identity 
and racial identity, were recoded to binary and examined for differences across groups using 
one-way ANOVA. Forty-nine participants had been randomly assigned to condition one, 49 
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participants had been randomly assigned to condition two, and 52 participants had been 
randomly assigned to condition three. The mean ages for each condition were 24.12 (4.21), 23.90 
(4.72), and 23.67 (3.63) respectively. Age did not significantly differ across conditions, F(2, 147) 
= .144, p = .866. The three conditions were comprised of a majority of White/Caucasian 
participants with each condition containing 26.5%, 32.7%, and 36.5% participants with a Non-
White racial identity, respectively. These proportions did not significantly differ across 
conditions, F(2, 147) = .581, p = .561. With respect to gender identity, while one condition did 
contain a participant who identified as Non-Binary, no conditions were significantly different 
from one another, F(2, 146) = .369, p = .692. The majority of participants in each condition were 
enrolled in their college or university full-time (79.6%, 81.6%, 78.9%; F(2, 147) = .064, p = 
.938) and either a Junior or Senior in standing (76.2%, 71.8%, 66.7%; F(2, 120) = .461, p = 
.632). A total of 27 participants reported their standing as Graduate Student. No one condition 
possessed a significant proportion of these individuals, F(2, 147) = .347, p = .708. Across 
conditions, 89.9%, 75.5%, and 82.7% of participants were employed at least part-time, F(2, 147) 
= 1.751, p = .177. While all three conditions contained participants who had engaged in previous 
treatment with a QMHP and/or were presently engaged in treatment with a QMHP, the 
distribution of these individuals did not significantly differ across conditions, F(2, 147) = 1.464, 
p = .235 and F(2, 147) = 1.563, p = .213.  
While none of the conditions differed significantly with respect to the examined 
demographic characteristics, the groups did differ significantly with respect to the impact of the 
vignette. The main effect of whether or not the subject of the vignette (Jordan) was depressed 
was significant across groups, F(2, 146) = 3.374, p = .037. Post-hoc testing was conducted to 
determine the most significant difference between the groups. Due to the limited sample size of 
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the conditions, with two conditions containing fewer than 50 participants, and unequal variance 
among conditions as evidenced by Levene’s test, F(2, 146) = 14.762, p < .001, a Dunnett T3 test 
was performed. The resulting pair-wise comparisons revealed that 16.2% (p = .044) fewer 
participants in the second condition considered Jordan to be depressed as compared to 
participants in condition one. While a different of 10.8% existed between participants in 
condition two as compared with participants in condition three, this difference, like the 
difference between condition one and condition three (p = .630), was non-significant (p = .348). 
For those participants who did consider Jordan to be depressed, the rated severity of that 
depression was not significantly different across conditions, F(2, 129) = 2.238, p = .111. 
Model Creation 
 Path analysis was implemented to address Hypothesis three through Hypothesis 13. To 
properly evaluate these possibilities, a path model based upon a priori assumptions of construct 
relationships was created, which incorporated all of the observed variables in the study. The 
decision to seek mental health treatment was represented by an individual’s self-reported 
likelihood of engaging with a QMHP. Hope was modeled to predict self-stigma, situation 
specific utilization of intuition, situation specific utilization of rationality, cognitive flexibility, 
psychological flexibility, and an individual’s decision to seek mental health treatment as 
indicated by their reported likelihood of engaging with a QMHP. Self-stigma was modeled as a 
predictor of situation specific utilization of intuition, situation specific utilization of rationality, 
and the decision to seek mental health treatment. Both cognitive flexibility and psychological 
flexibility were modeled to predict each of the five facets of distress intolerance, which were 
modeled as predictors of the decision to seek mental health treatment. Situation specific 
rationality and situation specific intuition were modeled to predict the decision to seek mental 
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health treatment and were predicted by associated dispositional measures of rationality and 
intuition in addition to the aforementioned predictors.  
A priori determinants of model fit were selected per standards reviewed by Brown 
(2015), Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen (2008), and Hu and Bentler (1999).  SRMR and χ2 were 
evaluated as determinants of absolute fit. RMSEA was evaluated as a determinant of parsimony 
correction. Comparative fit was examined with CFI. Perfect fit of a model would be recognized 
through a non-significant result of the χ2 test. Excellent model fit would be evidenced by an 
SRMR below .06, RMSEA below .05, and a CFI equal to or above .960. An SRMR above .06 
but below .08 in combination with an RMSEA at or below .08 and/or a CFI equal to or above 
.950 would evidence good model fit. Acceptable model fit would be indicated by an SRMR 
below .09 but above .08, RMSEA below 1.0, and a CFI above .900. Poor model fit was defined 
by fit indices outside of these defined parameters, resulting in the rejection of the model. The 
initial iteration of the path model to address Hypotheses 3 through 13 displayed poor fit (χ2(49) = 
189.547, p < .001, CFI = .783, RMSEA = .138 (.120 - .157), SRMR = .103). Modification 
indices were reviewed per the guidelines established by Brown for exploring localized areas of 
model strain, and those associated with a scaled expected χ2 change values higher than 3.84 were 
considered significant for model fit improvement. Modifications below this threshold were not 
implemented. Modifications to predictive relationships were considered in context of conceptual 
and theoretical information and literature. When models were nested, change in χ2 (Δ-2LL) was 
tested for significance using an ANOVA proxy.  
The first modification was the modeling of a predictive relationship between 
dispositional rationality and cognitive flexibility. Model fit was improved but remained poor 
(χ2(48) = 152.337, p < .001, CFI = .839, RMSEA = .120 (.102 - .140), SRMR = .095). The 
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second modification was to model the residual covariance between psychological flexibility and 
situational intuition. Despite the significant improvement in model fit (Δ-2LL = 18.152, p < 
.001), fit remained poor (χ2(47) = 134.478, p < .001, CFI = .865, RMSEA = .111 (.092 - .131), 
SRMR = .082). Next, the residual covariance between the physical discomfort facet of distress 
intolerance and self-stigma was modeled. While model fit was significantly improved (Δ-2LL = 
11.814, p < .001), poor model fit was evidenced (χ2(46) = 125.916, p < .001, CFI = .877, 
RMSEA = .108 (.088 - .128), SRMR = .082). A residual covariance between cognitive flexibility 
and situational rationality was then modeled improving model fit significantly (Δ-2LL = 4.457, p 
= .035). The model still displayed poor fit (χ2(45) = 120.676, p < .001, CFI = .883, RMSEA = 
.106 (.086 - .126), SRMR = .081). 
The sixth modification modeled a predictive relationship between dispositional 
rationality and the ambiguity facet of distress intolerance. This model displayed adequate fit 
(χ2(44) = 101.497, p < .001, CFI = .911, RMSEA = .093 (.072 - .115), SRMR = .080). 
Modifications were examined, and meaningful alterations remained. The next model, which 
accounted for the residual covariance between situational rationality and the uncertainty facet of 
distress intolerance, showed significant improvement in model fit (Δ-2LL = 7.185, p = .007) and 
displayed adequate fit (χ2(43) = 95.813, p < .001, CFI = .919, RMSEA = .090 (.069 - .112), 
SRMR = .079). Next the residual covariance between situational rationality and the negative 
emotion facet of distress intolerance was modeled. This significantly improved model fit (Δ-2LL 
= 5.836, p = .016) and displayed adequate fit (χ2(42) = 90.801, p < .001, CFI = .925, RMSEA = 
.088 (.066 - .110), SRMR = .078). A final predictive relationship was modeled between 
cognitive flexibility and self-stigma. This resulting model evidenced good fit (see Figure 1; 
χ2(41) = 80.010, p < .001, CFI = .940, RMSEA = .080 (.056 - .103), SRMR = .069). 
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Study Hypotheses 
 H1. It was hypothesized that the decision to seek mental health treatment would not 
display the phenomenon of relativity. This was explored using a χ2 test to examine the frequency 
with which participants endorsed the various courses of action with which they were presented 
following the presentation of the vignette. In the second study condition, participants were 
provided a choice between avoidance (“Intentionally engage more with free activities such as 
working longer hours, exercising more, spending time with friends, or others that are meant to 
bring pleasure. I know that these activities might provide me with temporary relief and may not 
offer long-term benefits to my concerns.”) and seeking treatment (“Intentionally engage with a 
qualified mental-health professional (i.e., counselor, social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, 
therapist), free of charge. I know that this activity might provide me with temporary relief and 
may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns.”).  
Predicted disconfirmation of relativity necessitated the selection frequency of each option 
in the second condition to significantly differ. The result of the χ2 test was non-significant, χ2(2) 
= 3.038, p = .219. In the third condition, a third option was included, which was designed to be a 
less advantageous version of the option to seek treatment in that the person with whom the 
participant would engage would not have formal therapy training (“Intentionally engage with a 
confidante without formal therapy training (i.e., close friend, family member, significant other, 
religious figure), free of charge. I know that this activity might provide me with temporary relief 
and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns.”). Disconfirmation of relativity would 
have necessitated the frequency of each option to non-significantly differ. The result of the χ2 test 
was non-significant, χ2(2) = 3.038, p = .219. However, there was an observable trend in the data 
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wherein the residual in avoidance decreased from 1.5 to -4.3 and the residual in seeking 
treatment increased from -1.5 to 5.7. This hypothesis was thus partially supported.  
 H2. It was hypothesized that as participants were presented with more options with which 
to engage, their likelihood of engaging with a QMHP would significantly decline. The first 
condition contained no stated options, while conditions two and three retained the options stated 
in the previous hypothesis. To test this, a one-way ANOVA was run to examine the self-reported 
likelihood of engaging a QMHP across conditions. The main effect across conditions was found 
to be non-significant, F(2, 146) = 2.279, p = .106; however, there was an observed drop-off 
between the mean of the first condition, Μ = 5.25 (1.42), and both condition two, Μ = 4.55 
(1.95), and condition three, Μ = 4.73 (1.61).  
To explore this difference, a post hoc contrast was performed to explore the difference 
between condition one and the combined means of conditions two and three. The t-test 
performed was done assuming unequal variances as indicated by Levene’s test, F(2, 146) = 
3.223, p = .043. At a critical value of p = .05, the resulting t value was significant, t(112.513) = 
2.240, p = .027; however, this test was not determined a priori and was a secondary test of 
significance in the same analysis, therefore a Bonferroni correction was implemented to avoid 
Type I error. At the adjusted critical value of p = .025, the result of the contrast was non-
significant. This hypothesis was not supported. 
 H3. The third hypothesis expected significantly negative relationships between each facet 
of distress intolerance and the decisions to seek mental health treatment as represented by a 
participant’s self-reported likelihood of engaging a QMHP. The five facets represented on the 
Distress Intolerance Scale were uncertainty, ambiguity, frustration, physical discomfort, and 
negative emotion. To explore this hypothesis, the final path model was referenced and the 
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standardized beta weights between each of the five facets and the decision to seek mental health 
treatment were examined. The relationship between the intolerance of uncertainty and the 
decision to seek mental health treatment was non-significant, β = .066, p = .474, as was the 
relationship between the intolerance of ambiguity and the decision to seek mental health 
treatment, β = -.121, p = .115. Intolerance of frustration and intolerance of negative emotion also 
displayed non-significant relationships to seeking mental health treatment, β = -.062, p = .534; β 
= .125, p = .280. The intolerance of physical discomfort displayed a significant small-effect to 
the decision to seek mental health treatment, β = .175, p = .027. This hypothesis was not 
supported. 
 H4. With the fourth hypothesis, it was expected that the intolerance of uncertainty and 
the intolerance of ambiguity would each have a significantly negative relationships with the 
decision to seek mental health treatment defined in the same way as in hypothesis three. It also 
was expected that these negative relationships would be impactful above and beyond the 
combined effect of the intolerance of frustration (f), the intolerance of physical discomfort (p), 
and the intolerance of negative emotion (n). To test this, parameters were defined within the final 
path model to draw contrasts between standardized beta weights. First, a contrast was drawn 
between the effect of the intolerance of uncertainty on the decision to seek mental health 
treatment and the combined effect of f, p, and n on the decision to seek mental health treatment. 
These effects were not significantly different, βdiff = -.172, p = .155.  
Second, a contrast was drawn between the effect of the intolerance of ambiguity on the 
decision to seek mental health treatment and the combined effect of f, p, and n on the decision to 
seek mental health treatment. These effects were significantly different, βdiff = -.359, p = .001. 
This indicated that the combined effect of frustration, physical discomfort, and negative emotion, 
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β = .238, p = .005, was more impactful than the effect of ambiguity, β = -.121, p = .115. The 
combined effect of the intolerance of uncertainty and the intolerance of ambiguity on the 
decision to seek mental health treatment also was contrasted with the combined effect of f, p, and 
n on the decision to seek mental health treatment. These effects were significantly different, βdiff 
= -.293, p = .045, favoring the combined effect of frustration, physical discomfort, and negative 
emotion over the combined effect of uncertainty and ambiguity, β = -.055, p = .545. This 
hypothesis was not supported.  
 H5. It was hypothesized that self-stigma would display a significantly negative 
relationship with situational rationality, situational intuition, and the decision to seek mental 
health treatment as defined in hypothesis three. To examine this hypothesis, the standardized 
beta weights from the final path model were referenced. In particular, the standardized beta 
weights for the relationships of self-stigma to each of the constructs of interest were noted. Self-
stigma did not display a significant relationship to either situational rationality, β = -.131, p = 
.188, or situational intuition, β = .171, p = .077. The relationship between self-stigma and the 
decision to seek mental health treatment was significant, β = -.494, p < .001. This hypothesis was 
partially supported.  
 H6. The sixth hypothesis anticipated a significant negative relationship between hope and 
self-stigma. To explore this hypothesis, the standardized beta weight for the relationship between 
hope and self-stigma from the final path model was referenced. Prior to the inclusion of 
cognitive flexibility as a predictor of self-stigma, the relationship between hope and self-stigma 
was significant; however, upon inclusion of cognitive flexibility as a predictor of self-stigma in 
the final model, hope displayed a non-significant negative relationship with self-stigma, β = -
.084, p = .480. This hypothesis was not supported.  
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 H7. The seventh hypothesis predicted a significant positive relationship between hope 
and both cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility.  Standardized beta weights from the 
final path model were examined to explore this hypothesis. Hope displayed a significant positive 
relationship to cognitive flexibility, β = .433, p < .001, and a significant positive relationship to 
psychological flexibility, β = .610, p < .001. This hypothesis was supported.   
 H8. With the eighth hypothesis, it was expected that hope would display a significantly 
positive relationship with both situational rationality and situational intuition. The final path 
model was referenced to evaluate the standardized beta weights for the relationships between 
hope and situational rationality and hope and situational intuition. The relationship between hope 
and situational rationality was significantly positive, β = .311, p = .001. Hope displayed a non-
significant negative relationship to situational intuition, β = -.127, p = .192. This hypothesis was 
partially supported.  
 H9. It was hypothesized that hope would display a significantly positive relationship with 
the decision to seek mental health treatment as defined in hypothesis three. The standardized beta 
weight for the relationship between hope and the decision to seek mental health treatment from 
the final path model was referenced. Hope displayed a non-significant positive relationship to the 
decision to seek mental health treatment, β = .010, p = .912. This hypothesis was partially 
supported.  
 H10. With the tenth hypothesis, it was expected that situational rationality and situational 
intuition would not significantly differ in their effects on the decision to seek mental health 
treatment as defined in hypothesis three. The final path model was referenced to test this 
hypothesis. A contrast was drawn with the standardized beta weight for the relationship between 
situational rationality and the decision to seek mental health treatment and with the standardized 
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beta weight for the relationship between situational intuition and the decision to seek mental 
health treatment. The difference between these relationships was non-significant, βdiff = .070, p = 
.430. It should be noted that neither the relationship between situational rationality and the 
decision to seek mental health treatment, β = .097, p = .252, nor the relationship between 
situational intuition and the decision to seek mental health treatment, β = .027, p = .730, was 
significant. This hypothesis was partially supported.  
 H11. It was hypothesized that situational rationality and situational intuition would be 
significantly more influenced by the combined effects of hope and self-stigma than by 
dispositional rationality or dispositional intuition respectively. To test this hypothesis, the 
standardized beta weights in the final path model were referenced. Using these beta weights, a 
contrast was first drawn between the combined effect of hope and self-stigma on situational 
rationality and the effect of dispositional rationality on situational rationality. The relationship 
between these effects was non-significant, βdiff = .012, p = .936. Next, a contrast was drawn 
between the combined effect of hope and self-stigma on situational intuition and the effect of 
dispositional intuition on situational intuition. The relationship between these effects was non-
significant, βdiff = -.460, p = .082. It should be noted that situational rationality and situational 
intuition were both significantly impacted by their associated dispositional domains, β = .168, p 
= .028; β = .505, p < .001. While dispositional intuition was the only significant predictor of 
situational intuition, both hope, β = .311, p < .001, and dispositional rationality, β = .168, p = 
.028 contributed to situational rationality and not at significantly different rates, βdiff = .143, p = 
.167. This hypothesis was not supported.  
 H12. In hypothesis twelve, it was predicted that both psychological flexibility and 
cognitive flexibility would display significantly negative relationships to each of the five facets 
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of distress intolerance. Standardized beta weights from the final path model were analyzed to 
explore these relationships. Psychological flexibility displayed a significant negative relationship 
with the intolerance of uncertainty, β = -.534, p < .001, intolerance of frustration, β = -.628, p < 
.001, intolerance of physical discomfort, β = -.312, p = .015, and intolerance of negative 
emotion, β = -.705, p < .001. Unexpectedly, psychological flexibility displayed a significant 
positive relationship with the intolerance of ambiguity, β = .366, p < .001. Cognitive flexibility 
displayed a significantly negative relationship with the intolerance of ambiguity, β = -.265, p = 
.011, and a significantly positive relationship with the intolerance of frustration, β = .184, p = 
.048. Significant relationships were not found between cognitive flexibility and the intolerance of 
uncertainty, β = -.113, p = .202, the intolerance of physical discomfort, β = -.052, p = .628, or the 
intolerance of negative emotion, β = -.009, p = .895. This hypothesis was partially supported.  
 H13. In the thirteenth and final hypothesis, it was predicted that psychological flexibility 
and cognitive flexibility would not significantly differ in their relationships to each of the five 
facets of distress intolerance. To explore this hypothesis, the associated standardized beta 
weights from the final path model were referenced. Contrasts were drawn between the 
standardized beta weight for psychological flexibility and the standardized beta weight for 
cognitive flexibility with respect to the intolerance of uncertainty, βdiff = -.421, p = .001, the 
intolerance of ambiguity, βdiff = .630, p < .001, the intolerance of frustration, βdiff = -.812, p < 
.001, the intolerance of physical discomfort, βdiff = -.260, p = .135, and the intolerance of 
negative emotion, βdiff = -.696, p < .001. In all of the significant contrasts, psychological 
flexibility was a more significant predictor than was cognitive flexibility. This hypothesis was 
partially supported.  
Mediations 
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 Self-Stigma. In the final path model, possible mediations existed between self-stigma 
and the decision to seek mental health treatment via situational rationality and situational 
intuition. Parameters were defined within the final path model to allow for the evaluation of 
these relationships. The overall indirect effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental 
health treatment was non-significant, β = -.008, p = .676. Despite the non-significance of the 
overall indirect effect, the total mediation effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental 
health treatment was significant, β = -.503, p < .001. In an attempt to explore this mediation 
further, each mediator was individually examined.  
The indirect effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental health treatment was not 
significantly mediated by situational rationality, as evidenced by a non-significant indirect effect, 
β = -.013, p = .447. Despite the non-significance of the indirect effect, the total mediation effect 
of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental health treatment via situational rationality was 
significant, β = -.507, p < .001. The indirect effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental 
health treatment was not significantly mediated by situational intuition, β = .005, p = .735. The 
total effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental health treatment as mediated by 
situational intuition, however, was significant, β = -.490, p < .001. Provided the results of the 
exploration of the role of each mediator, the significance found with respect to the total effects 
indicated the magnitude and significance of the relationship between self-stigma and the decision 
to seek mental health treatment, β = -.494, p < .001, rather than the significant effect of intuition 
or rationality as mediators. It is worth noting that self-stigma explained 27% of the variance in 
the decision to seek mental health treatment, r2 = .270. 
Hope. Several possible mediations presented in the final model for the relationship 
between hope and the decision to seek mental health treatment. Possible mediators included 
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situational rationality, situational intuition, and self-stigma. Defined parameters within the final 
model allowed for the exploration of these relationships. Overall, the total effect of the 
relationship of hope to the decision to seek mental health treatment was non-significant, β = .078, 
p = .463. Overall, the total indirect effect of hope on the decision to seek mental health treatment 
as mediated by situational rationality, situational intuition, and self-stigma was non-significant, β 
= .068, p = .311. Exploration of the indirect effect per each individual mediator yielded no 
significant results with respect to situational rationality, β = .030, p = .286, situational intuition, β 
= -.003, p = .731, or self-stigma, β = .486, p = .041. In combination with a non-significant direct 
effect between hope and the decision to seek mental health treatment, β = .010, p = .912, none of 
the indirect effects yielded significant total effects, β = .040, p = .625; β = .007, p = .943; β = 
.051, p = .642. 
The final path model also contained possible mediations between hope and situational 
rationality, situational intuition, and self-stigma. Defined parameters within the final model 
allowed for the exploration of these relationships. The total effect of hope on situational intuition 
as mediated by self-stigma was non-significant, β = -.141, p = .145. Upon exploration of the 
indirect effect of hope on situational intuition via self-stigma, β = -.014, p = .482, it was 
determined that self-stigma was not a significant mediator of the relationship between hope and 
situational intuition. The total effect of hope on situational rationality as mediated by self-stigma, 
however, was significant, β = .322, p = .001. This significant total effect was present despite a 
non-significant indirect effect of hope on situational rationality as mediated by self-stigma, β = 
.011, p = .485. Similar to what was found in self-stigma, the significance of the direct effect of 
hope on situational rationality as mediated by self-stigma is due to the significance and 
magnitude of the relationship between hope and situational rationality, rather than the mediating 
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effect of self-stigma. It should be noted that hope explained 22% of the variance in situational 
rationality (r2 = .220). The modeling of cognitive flexibility as a predictor of self-stigma created 
a mediation between hope and self-stigma via cognitive flexibility. The total effect of this 
relationship was significant, β = -.258, p = .006, as was the indirect effect, β = -.174, p = .002. 
The results of these analyses, in combination with a significant reduction in the relationship 
between hope and self-stigma upon the inclusion of cognitive flexibility into the final model, 
indicated that cognitive flexibility is a full mediator of the relationship between hope and self-
stigma.  
Discussion 
 Though many of the hypotheses of this study were not supported, each provided 
information critical to understanding the interplay of self-stigma, hope, and the decision to seek 
mental health treatment. Beyond the confines of this study, information illuminated by the 
findings suggests important findings for current theory and past research. Some inferences can be 
made about the practical application of the dynamics studied, as well as provide guidance and 
suggestions for future research with respect to theoretical assertions and the way in which the 
constructs within this study could be observed in the future. This study, like any other, is not 
without its weaknesses and still evidences insights that could help to shape the way in which 
self-stigma and the decision to seek mental health treatment is addressed in theory and in 
practice. Before the primary findings of the study can be addressed, however, three significant 
model modifications to predictive relationships need to be contextualized.   
Relationship Justifications  
The first predictive relationship was dispositional rationality as a predictor of cognitive 
flexibility. To contextualize this relationship as more than an artifact of the data, the core 
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elements of each construct are examined. Rationality is an effortful cognitive process centered 
around careful, controlled, cognitive analysis (Ariely & Norton, 2010; Epstein, 2003; Kahneman, 
2003). Per the items of the Rational-Experiential Inventory, the primary measure to quantify the 
rational and experiential (intuitive) dynamics of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, rationality 
can manifest as a preference for complex situations and critical thought and evaluation of 
complex problems (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to 
transition cognitive set, thought, or attention in order to perceive, process, or respond to 
situations in different ways (Eslinger & Grattam, 1993).  As reflected in the items of the 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory, it manifests as the perception of being in control, considering 
multiple perspectives, solving difficult problems, and careful, systematic consideration of 
information and alternative decisions (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Additionally, cognitive 
flexibility has been observed as a critical component in the decision-making process, having an 
impact in the dynamic between rationality and intuition (Laureiro-Martinez & Brusoni, 2018). 
Provided these elements of theory and research, the modeled relationship represents a 
quantitative test of theory rooted in conceptual similarities and the demonstrated integral 
dynamic among these characteristics.   
 A second predictive relationship was modeled that held dispositional rationality as a 
predictor of the intolerance of ambiguity. Again, referencing the Rational-Experiential Inventory, 
the primary measure to quantify the rational and experiential (intuitive) dynamics of Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory, rationality is characterized by a preference for complex situations, 
critical and systematic thought, abstract thought, learning new ways of thinking, and intellectual 
challenges (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Relatedly, intolerance of ambiguity is recognized as an 
inability to tolerate complicated (i.e., making complex decisions or needing to implement 
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thorough and systematic thought), foreign (i.e., learning a new way of thinking), or vague (i.e., 
the necessity of information abstraction) situations (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). Provided the 
way in which the characteristics are defined and conceptualized, the modeled relationship 
represents a theory-based, quantitative test of the relationship between the two constructs.   
 The final predictive relationship factored into the model was the influence of cognitive 
flexibility on self-stigma. As stated previously, cognitive flexibility is the way in which people 
can shift their thought process or attention to understand, process, or respond to a variety of 
situations (Eslinger & Grattam, 1993). Individuals with lower levels of cognitive flexibility tend 
to respond in more rigid and less adaptive ways to problematic beliefs and behaviors (Silberstein, 
et al., 2012; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008). Furthermore, individuals with greater cognitive 
flexibility are more likely to appraise a situation as a growth opportunity rather than a threat or 
loss, particularly when these situations are complex or unpredictable (Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 
2008). Self-stigma is the internalization of public-stigma of mental health wherein individuals 
begin to experience a negative impact on their self-concept and image as a result of their beliefs 
about mental health concerns. According to the items on the Self-Stigma of Seeking Help Scale, 
self-stigma manifests as a feeling of inadequacy, inferiority, and feeling worse about oneself. 
This resulting diminished self-concept would meet the conditions for a loss appraisal (see 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). Cognitive flexibility has demonstrated its importance in allowing for 
the recognition and integration of alternative information into the decision-making process 
(Laureiro-Martinez & Brusoni, 2018), as well as the appraisal of a situation as a growth 
opportunity rather than a threat or a loss. Perhaps it can allow people to refocus away from their 
attention on their diminished self-concept as a result of facing mental health challenges or 
seeking mental health treatment to the potential for growth and recovery as a result of seeking 
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help, as they consider the decision to seek mental health treatment. Provided these links, the 
modeled relationship offers a theory-based, quantitative analysis of the relationships among these 
critical characteristics.  
Primary Findings 
 The decision to seek mental health treatment. The first hypothesis predicted that the 
phenomenon of relativity as described by Ariely (2010) would not be replicated. In condition 
two of the present study, the choice to engage in pleasurable activities free of charge without the 
promise of immediate or long-term improvement (A1; avoid) was juxtaposed with an equivalent 
choice to engage with a qualified mental health professional free of charge without the promise 
of immediate or long-term improvement (B1; engage mental health treatment). If relativity were 
expressed in this dynamic, it would be expected that the rate at which the two options were 
endorsed would not significantly differ from one another, as when given the choice between an 
all-expenses paid trip to Rome (A2) or an all-expenses paid trip to Paris (B2), each is selected at 
an equal rate. In condition two of the study, consistent with relativity, the option to avoid (A1) 
was endorsed at an equivalent rate to the choice to engage mental health treatment (B1).  
Condition three presented three options to further test the potential impact of relativity. 
The options from the second study condition were retained. An additional option allowed 
participants to choose to engage with a trusted confidante, without formal mental health training, 
free of charge without the promise of immediate or long-term improvement (B1-). This option 
was the equivalent of introducing an all-expenses paid trip to Paris with the exception of 
breakfast. (B2-). Relativity would predict a significant disparity between the decision to engage 
with mental health treatment and the decision to avoid as the decision comparison would 
primarily be made between the two most closely related items, B1 and B1-. Thus, despite some 
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evidence for relativity, the phenomenon was not fully observed. This could mean that the 
decision to engage with mental health treatment is free from relativity. In this particular decision, 
more information is taken into account than that which is immediately relevant to the decision 
and its anticipated outcomes; however, provided the observed shift in levels of option 
endorsement between condition two and condition three, this is a supposition which warrants 
further investigation before more definitive conclusions can be drawn. 
Related to the results of the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis predicted that as 
people are provided with more options other than treatment with a qualified mental health 
professional, they would become less likely to engage in mental health treatment. As this 
hypothesis was not supported, it may indicate that the treatment of mental health disorders is 
viewed as acceptable, somewhat independent of mental health stigma (Pescosolido et al., 2010). 
People may choose to avoid engagement with qualified mental health professionals so as to 
avoid the self-stigma which may accompany such a decision, and the average person may be 
more open to the idea of treatment as an option should they find themselves in a place where 
they deem it necessary. Furthermore, the non-significant finding may provide support for 
Golberstein, Eisenberg, and Gollust (2008) in that attitudes toward seeking treatment are not 
necessarily predictive of treatment seeking behaviors. The result of this hypothesis, particularly 
as it relates to the observed trend that was tested post hoc wherein participants provided with no 
options appeared to rate themselves at a higher likelihood of engaging with mental health 
treatment as compared to those who were provided options, necessitates further study.  
The eighth study hypothesis was partially supported. It was expected that hope would 
foster a balanced approach to decision making. Instead, it was found that hope was critical in 
generating a rational perspective in the decision-making process. Thus, the more hopeful a 
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person is, the more they will attempt to engage in a systematic, rule-based, comprehensive 
review of all options present in a decision. This increased utilization of rational processes could 
complicate a person’s ability to make an effective decision for him or herself (Ariely & Norton, 
2010; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). This complication could be exacerbated by the fact that 
hope does not act as a counter-weight in positively influencing intuitive processes. This lends 
support for the label of hope as a cognitive theory (Snyder, 2002).  
While hope may increase a rational perspective within the dynamic of a decision-making 
event, it does not necessarily certify that the perspective will be applied to a decision in a 
significant way. The tenth hypothesis expected that the decision to seek mental health treatment 
would benefit from a balanced utilization of rational and intuitive processes. The partial support 
found for this hypothesis indicates that, while rational and intuitive processes equally contribute 
to the decision to seek mental health treatment, these contributions are not the primary influence 
on such a decision. Thus, the decision to seek mental health treatment could be an adaptive 
decision, however, it is likely one born of necessity and urgent need (Frank & Frank, 1993) 
rather than one derived through education and engagement around the various dynamics of the 
decision’s implications and impacts. 
Other possible sources of influence on the decision-making process, as examined by the 
eleventh hypothesis, include a person’s long-standing tendency to use rational or intuitive 
processes, as well as the combined influence of hope and self-stigma. It was found that the most 
important observed contributor to the use of rationality or intuition, as it relates to the decision to 
seek mental health treatment, is an individual’s long-standing utilization of rationality or 
intuition. For instance, if an individual has always used rational processes throughout his or her 
life when faced with any decision, then that behavior is more likely to encourage his or her use 
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of rationality in a decision-making event centered around seeking mental health treatment. 
Similarly, a person’s life-long utilization of intuition is the greatest observed predictor of 
intuition with respect to the decision to seek mental health treatment. These influences appear to 
transcend the influence of situation specific information such as mental health self-stigma. This 
diminished influence of decision relevant information on the decision-making process is in 
contrast with what has been observed in other decision-making events (Ariely, 2010; Kahneman, 
2003) and consistent with the assertion that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior 
(Ouellette & Wood, 1998). 
 Hope and self-stigma. The anticipated influence of hope on the decision to seek mental 
health treatment is most directly addressed in hypothesis nine. This hypothesis was not 
supported. It was expected that hope would significantly increase a person’s likelihood of 
seeking mental health treatment. This is not what was observed, at least not as a direct 
relationship. Instead, while it is possible that a person’s level of hope would provide a small 
amount of encouragement for the person to seek mental health treatment, this relationship cannot 
be stated with confidence. Ultimately the relationship displayed in this study is not meaningful. 
Additionally, this relationship is not better explained by any mediating factor such as self-stigma, 
rationality, or intuition. An important direct association with the decision to seek mental health 
treatment is self-stigma.  
The fifth study hypothesis explored the relationship of self-stigma both on the decision to 
seek mental health treatment as well as the rational and intuitive decision-making processes 
utilized to arrive at such a conclusion. This hypothesis only garnered partial support. Self-stigma 
did not display a meaningful relationship to either rational or intuitive processes in the decision 
to seek mental health treatment. As with hope, there was no significant mediating relationship 
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with rationality or intuition. There does exist a significant relationship between a person’s 
internalized mental health stigma and their decision to seek mental health treatment. This 
relationship might seem intuitive, as it is consistent with previous research (Eisenberg et al., 
2009; Vogel et al., 2017). Noteworthy, however, is not that the relationship exists but rather the 
magnitude of the relationship that exists. Self-stigma alone explains just over a quarter of a 
person’s rationale behind their decision to seek mental health treatment.  
Addressed by hypothesis 6 is whether or not hope could offer some preventative factor 
against self-stigma. The relationship between hope and self-stigma is not meaningful. In 
combination with the relationship between hope and cognitive flexibility and the relationship 
between cognitive flexibility and self-stigma, however, hope has a much more important role to 
play. It was determined that the relationship between hope and self-stigma was fully explained 
by cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is the mechanism through which hope operates to 
reduce the intensity of self-stigma a person experiences. Increased hope is associated with 
increased cognitive flexibility, which relates to the ability to consider alternative perspectives 
and integrate new information (Laureiro-Martinez & Brusoni, 2018). This ability to see 
information from an alternative perspective may then decrease the rigid response of appraising 
an opportunity for growth as a threat, or in the case of self-stigma, as a loss (MacDonald et al., 
2015; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008).  
 Distress intolerance and flexibility. The third hypothesis explored the assertion that a 
person’s intolerance of distress would dissuade them from engaging in mental health treatment. 
This assertion was dependent upon the observation that people do not accurately predict their 
reactions to and experiences in situations, even with the benefit of past related experience 
(Meyvis et al., 2010). Thus, when faced with the options to engage with therapy, particularly if 
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the situation is recognized as uncertain or ambiguous (Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008), an individual 
who does not tolerate those circumstances well would be less likely to engage in that situation. 
This hypothesis was not supported. While a person’s intolerance of complicated, vague, or 
foreign stimuli (ambiguity; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995) or their intolerance of being 
aggravated or prevented from accomplishing their goals (frustration; Leyro et al., 2010) could 
discourage them from engaging in mental health treatment to some degree, these are not 
observed to be meaningful or likely influences in the decision.  
Unexpectedly, an individual’s inability to tolerate the prospect of future situations that 
are uncertain (uncertainty; Buhr & Dugas, 2002), as well as an individual’s inability to tolerate 
internal or emotional distress (negative emotion; Simons & Gaher, 2005), could encourage 
engagement with mental health treatment. These influences, much like the influences of the 
intolerance of ambiguity and the intolerance of frustration, were not observed to be a meaningful 
or likely influence. What is, initially, most surprising is the encouragement to seek mental health 
treatment demonstrated by the intolerance of experiencing physical discomfort or pain (physical 
discomfort; Schmidt et al., 2009). Upon further reflection, mental health symptoms can manifest 
with physical symptoms. With respect to depression, this is most commonly observed through 
fatigue and the loss of appetite (American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013; Wittenborn & 
Buhler, 1979). Therefore, if a person is not able to withstand physical discomfort, then it stands 
to reason that the experience of such would encourage them to seek treatment. Provided this, it is 
unsurprising that the influence of uncertainty, the influence of ambiguity, and the combined 
influence of uncertainty and ambiguity were not more important than the combined influence of 
physical discomfort, negative emotion, and frustration with respect to the decision to seek mental 
health treatment, as was examined in the fourth hypothesis.  
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 It was predicted in the twelfth hypothesis that both cognitive flexibility and psychological 
flexibility would display negative relationships with each facet of distress intolerance, as greater 
flexibility is associated with more adaptive responses (Silberstein et al., 2012; Yakhnich & Ben-
Zur, 2008). Upon examination, this hypothesis is only partially supported. Psychological 
flexibility does have a universal impact on an individual’s ability to tolerate distress. As a 
person’s psychological flexibility is fostered, the individual can better tolerate uncertainty, 
frustration, physical discomfort, and negative emotions. Noteworthy is that, as a person increases 
his or her psychological flexibility, he or she may be decreasing their ability to tolerate 
ambiguity. Cognitive flexibility by contrast had only two meaningful relationships with distress 
tolerance. Specifically, more cognitive flexibility was associated with an individual’s ability to 
tolerate ambiguity. This relationship is observed again in a person’s ability to tolerate frustration. 
This time, cognitive flexibility dictates a significant decrease in a person’s ability to tolerate 
being aggravated or hindered in their goal pursuits, while psychological flexibility better equips a 
person to tolerate such an experience.  
 In order to better understand cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility as related 
but separate characteristics of the same overarching influence (Whiting et al., 2015), each of 
their relationships with distress intolerance were examined by the thirteenth hypothesis. In each 
dynamic of distress intolerance, psychological flexibility displayed a larger influence than did 
cognitive flexibility. This was true of each dynamic except for the tolerance of physical 
discomfort wherein the ability to consider alternative perspectives held the same degree of 
influence as the ability to engage mindfulness and engage change behaviors. While the 
hypothesis that both iterations of flexibility are part of an overarching construct of flexibility 
may not have been supported per the parameters of this study, it can be reasonably concluded 
 
 76 
that by increasing cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility, a person would, in general, 
increase their ability to tolerate distress.  
 Influence over cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility was addressed in 
hypothesis seven. As hope increases for people, so too does their ability to see themselves as 
having some degree of control over a situation and to think of alternative perspectives for a given 
situation or decision (cognitive flexibility), as well as their ability to engage in behavior change 
and mindfulness (psychological flexibility). Both cognitive flexibility and psychological 
flexibility deal with thought processes, and so it may be expected that a cognitive characteristic, 
such as hope, would increase the prevalence of two other cognitive dynamics. In so doing, a 
person’s ability to make adaptive decisions and engage in less avoidance may be increased 
(Whiting et al., 2015; Yakhnich & Ben-Zur, 2008).  
Implications for Existing Theory 
 While inconclusive in the present study, the influence or lack of influence by relativity 
has important implications for research, both with respect to relativity and to how people decide 
to pursue or avoid mental health treatment. If relativity ultimately is not replicated, then it would 
alter the understanding of how unconscious influences impact the decision-making process. 
Importantly, it would provide support for the notion that a person will often choose to engage a 
known negative outcome rather than engage an uncertain alternative (see Dugas, Buhr, & 
Ladouceur, 2004). This influence of a known negative outcome would seemingly be independent 
of the influence of the way in which a decision is framed. If relativity eventually is observed, it 
would emphasize the importance of how decisions are framed (see Ariely, 2010), particularly the 
decision to seek mental health treatment. Another potential implication, under the parameters of 
the current design, is the implication for access to services.  
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The partial observation of relativity was under the condition that treatment with a QMHP 
was free of charge in order to remain commensurate with engaging in a trusted confidante, such 
as a friend, and engaging in pleasurable activities. Research has shown that people are more 
inclined to make decision that will allow them to avoid loss (Ariely et al., 2005; Viscusi & 
Chesson, 1999). Without the guarantee that mental health treatment can be helpful, the 
associated cost for services could be appraised as a threat, depending upon the prospective 
client’s situation. If financial resources were expended under this threat appraisal and no 
discernable benefit is had from treatment, the subsequent decision to engage with mental health 
treatment could be appraised as loss.  
 Another inconclusive dynamic of this study concerns the potential decrease in the 
likelihood of seeking mental health treatment when the decision is made more complicated 
through the introduction of various options with which to engage. If a significant different in 
self-reported likelihood were observed, then it potentially indicates the decision to seek mental 
health treatment as one that benefits more from intuitive processes than from rational processes. 
This differential benefit would be consistent with existing literature, which suggests that intuitive 
processes may be more adept at handling complex decisions than are rational processes (Dane et 
al., 2012, Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). By engaging intuitive processes 
rather than carefully controlled rational narratives, people may be able to move from basing their 
decision on a narrative about what a person like them would do to considering more their need 
for treatment and their ultimate well-being, not unlike the difference between wanting and liking 
(Winkielman & Berridge, 2003).  
 Another possible implication for current theory and research is that the decision to seek 
mental health treatment may not function in the same way as other decisions individuals may 
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make throughout their lives. Framing of a decision is critical to the outcome (Ariely, 2010) and 
situation relevant information is generally what is explored in the decision-making process 
because of its availability (Kahneman, 2003). In this study, information directly relevant to 
seeking mental health treatment (mental health self-stigma) held no significant influence over the 
utilization of situational rationality or situational intuition. Instead, situational rationality and 
situational intuition were more informed by dispositional rationality and dispositional intuition.  
Perhaps this observation is due to the context of the decision being made. Initial 
understandings derived from the study design implicated the topic of the decision to be the act of 
seeking mental health treatment. In this case, referenced information could reasonably include a 
person’s attitude toward mental health and themselves in context of mental health. Upon review, 
it instead is possible that the decision was framed around some aspect of a person’s internal self-
concept or identity; therefore, in an attempt to remain consistent with their identities, participants 
chose to engage in behavior that was most like them and referenced material, consciously or 
otherwise, regarding their dispositional context.  
 Consistent with previous literature is the significance of self-stigma on the outcome of 
the decision to engage with mental health treatment. Other studies have suggested, and this study 
supports, the idea that a significant portion of the decision to avoid treatment is due to the 
internalization of stigma about mental health and seeking help for mental health concerns 
(Eisenberg et al., 2009; Vogel et al., 2013; Vogel et al., 2017). Perhaps this fact is what has led to 
the significant increase in the access of primary care or general physical health services as the 
first point of contact in treatment for depression (Bishop et al., 2016; Wang et al. 2006). Perhaps 
an individual’s intolerance of physical discomfort leads them to seek mental health treatment 
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through a primary care setting as an appropriate venue for physical symptoms or as a less 
stigmatized setting for mental health concerns that have been somaticized (APA, 2013). 
 Both cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility have been observed as being 
negatively impacted by the presence and intensity of mental health symptoms (Whiting et al., 
2015). The present study demonstrated that hope may be a way by which both characteristics 
could be engendered as a way of counteracting the effects of mental health challenges. 
Furthermore, Whiting and colleagues suggested that both cognitive flexibility and psychological 
flexibility, due to their conceptual overlap, could be facets of a higher-order factor of general 
flexibility. The present study, while not fully supporting this consideration as the study 
parameters were defined, did evidence a relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
psychological flexibility. 
Implications for Practice and Future Research 
 Practice. The findings of this study have implications that transcend the understanding of 
current research and theoretical literature. For example, both cognitive flexibility and 
psychological flexibility can be significantly encumbered by mental health symptoms (Whiting, 
et al., 2015). The ability of hope to foster cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility 
reinforces the call issued by Snyder (2002) to foster hope in those who seek treatment. By 
investing therapeutic intervention into the development of hope, clinicians may help to develop 
other characteristics critical to making adaptive decisions and engaging in behavioral change in 
their clients.  
 This indirect influence on cognitive flexibility and psychological flexibility may 
inadvertently deter treatment. Assume an individual’s intolerance of physical discomfort spurred 
the decision to seek mental health treatment. An increase, particularly in psychological 
 
 80 
flexibility, was related to an increased tolerance in physical discomfort. If the factors that 
contribute to the initiation of treatment are the same as those that sustain treatment engagement, 
then increasing a person’s psychological flexibility by way of hope may lead to premature 
termination from services. To monitor for such an impact, careful examination of the therapeutic 
process and its effectiveness should be considered (Duncan, 2014).  
 At the same time, fostering cognitive flexibility could be an effective way to counter the 
effect of self-stigma on the decision to seek mental health treatment. Self-stigma was observed to 
have an impact nearly seven times greater than that of the intolerance of physical discomfort. 
Thus, if the factors that initiate treatment are the same that sustain treatment, clinicians could 
invest time in fostering cognitive flexibility either through the generation of hope or through 
cognitive-behavioral approaches (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). The findings also suggest that 
hope and cognitive flexibility could be meaningful targets for community intervention outside of 
the therapy office. By designing interventions to target self-stigma through the cultivation of 
meaningful and encouraging characteristics, more people who could benefit from treatment may 
choose to seek it out.  
 Research. The influence of relativity on the decision to seek mental health treatment 
deserves further study. A clearer understanding of this phenomenon in larger samples 
representative of college and other populations could have meaningful implications for the way 
in which mental health challenges and treatment are represented, discussed, covered, and 
encouraged. Beyond relativity, more research is needed to explore the impact of including 
additional options to the decision event. As has been indicated in past literature (Dijksterhuis & 
van Olden, 2006) the greater the degree to which a person consciously deliberates over their 
options, the greater their chance for lessened satisfaction. Research could examine observed 
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behavior to engage or avoid mental health treatment, and then note a person’s satisfaction with 
his or her decision relative to the process she or he engaged to reach the decision.  
 If, as Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) suggest, a balance in rational and intuitive 
processes is the ideal for making complex decisions, then a counterweight to the effect of hope 
should be sought out. At this time, hope is observed as a strong influence of rational processes 
but not intuitive processes. In order to maintain a balance in process utilization, another trait 
could be identified to create a more well-rounded intervention program to facilitate the decision-
making process. Furthermore, the relationship between hope and cognitive flexibility should be 
verified through replication in both related and disparate samples and settings. A relationship of 
that magnitude and with its implications deserves a deeper understanding than can be offered by 
the present study.  
 Finally, the final model utilized in this study should be replicated in an independent 
sample. In particular, if the post hoc predictive relationships were validated in a separate sample 
and/or setting, this would offer support for the generalizability of the modifications observed in 
the present study, with respect to the significant relationship between hope, cognitive flexibility, 
and self-stigma. In addition to replicating the relationships in a new sample and/or setting, other 
validated and reliable measures of these constructs should be utilized to explore whether or not 
these relationships are limited to the iterations of these constructs as defined by the measures 
used in this study or if the relationships transcend to the larger psychological constructs. It also 
would be important to note the differential functioning of the implemented model in context of 
participants’ characteristics such as previous and current experiences with mental health 
treatment, gender-identity, as well as the nature of their selected course of action (i.e., avoidance, 
engaging a confidant, engaging a QMHP).  
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Study Limitations 
 As with any other study, there are limitations which limit the degree to which the current 
findings can be generalized. One such limitation is related to the sample utilized for study. While 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service has been reviewed as a viable alternative to samples 
collected through university research pools (Behrend et al., 2011), there is no way to verify the 
veracity of respondents claims to meet the inclusion criteria. Another challenge specific to this 
sample is its size. Some critical observations narrowly missed classification of significance. It is 
possible that the sample did not provide adequate power to detect all of the meaningful effects 
and relationships within the broader analysis. 
 Another challenge present in this study is that of construct validity with respect to the 
instruments used. This was best observed in the model fit statistics for each of the measures 
implemented. In some cases, the dimensionality the measures were purported to display were not 
achievable without substantial modifications which are not part of the theoretical literature on the 
given constructs. Some instruments also presented threats to internal validity due to the limited 
reliability of some of subscales utilized in the study. With limited reliability, it is possible that 
two participants with the same dispositions could display significantly different results on the 
same items and subsequent subscale score.  
 Other challenges were design specific. These include the decision to use participant self-
reported likelihood of engaging with a qualified mental health professional as a proxy for the 
decision to seek mental health treatment. In order to move observations beyond participant 
attitudes toward mental health treatment, a more definitive representation of the decision to 
engage in treatment could be utilized. While this study has the potential of implementing such an 
outcome through the decisions made by participants in study condition two and study condition 
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three, the exclusion of condition one would further decrease an already limited sample size by an 
additional 49 participants. Relatedly, the study could benefit from focusing on observed 
behavior. Rather than asking participants about their anticipated actions or likelihoods, framing 
the investigation around the participant’s self-reported present engagement with therapy could 
provide a more robust and authentic representation of how the general population might 
experience and resolve the process of choosing to seek mental health treatment.   
Summary 
 Mental health services are severely underutilized in the United States, and college 
campuses are no exception to this trend. There are a number of influences on a person’s decision 
to seek out mental health treatment. One critical influence is that of mental health self-stigma. 
Self-stigma decreases the likelihood that a person will choose to seek mental health treatment. 
As such, it serves as a critical juncture for intervention. An avenue of influence that could be 
directly targeted by interventions is hope.  
Hope demonstrates a significant influence over related constructs that can facilitate 
adaptive coping and less avoidance. In its relationship to cognitive flexibility specifically, hope 
can serve as a meaningful point of intervention to challenge self-stigma in an indirect manner. 
The relationship between cognitive flexibility and self-stigma is significant enough to warrant 
further study and to be considered as another critical opportunity for intervention.  
 More research is needed to obtain a more comprehensive understanding about the role of 
framing, information relevance, and option comparison within a decision about mental health 
treatment. Important is that further research and exploration seek to replicate the identified 
relationships within independent samples and in populations other than college students. 
Verification of these relationships, as well as continued exploration around the decision to seek 
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mental health treatment, could offer new perspectives about the way in which mental health 
professionals and society at large engage in a conversation and interaction about mental health 
challenges and mental health services. It is possible that, with dedicated exploration and 
intervention, people can be encouraged to seek out the treatment that may help them most in 
their time of need; that they can have hope for treatment.  
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Appendix A 
 
Directions: Please consider each of the following questions and indicate the answer that is most 
true for you.  
 
1. How many years old are you?  
 
  
 
2. With what gender identity do you most 
identify?  
 
   Male    Female   
   Non-Binary   Other 
 
3. If you selected “Other” in the previous 
question, please specify. 
 
  
 
4. With what racial/ethnic identity do you 
most identify?  
 
  Asian American    African 
American/Black  
  Latino/Latina/Lantinx    Native 
American  
  White/Caucasian    Other 
 
5. If you selected “Other” in the previous 
question, please specify: 
 
  
 
6. What is your relationship status?  
 
  Single    Dating    In a Committed 
Relationship 
  Engaged    Partnered    Married  
  Separated    Divorced    
Widowed 
 
7. With what sexual orientation do you most 
identify? 
 
  Heterosexual   Bisexual  
  Gay    Lesbian  
  Asexual    Other 
 
8. If you selected “Other” in the previous 
question, please specify. 
 
  
9. What year in school are you?  
 
  Freshman    Sophomore   
  Junior   Senior   
  Graduate Student 
 
10. What is your enrollment status?  
 
  Part-Time    Full-Time 
 
11. Are you a first-generation (neither your 
mother or father earned a college degree) 
student?  
 
  No    Yes 
 
12. What is your employment status?  
 
  Retired/Disabled    Unemployed  
  Part-Time    Full-Time 
 
13. Have you in your past attended therapy 
sessions with a qualified mental health 
professional (i.e., counselor, social 
worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, 
therapist)?  
 
  No    Yes 
 
 
 100 
14. If you answered yes on the previous 
question, please mark the line to indicate 
how helpful you found this 
experience/these experiences? 
 
Very Unhelpful  Neutral Very helpful 
   
 
15. If you answered yes on item 13, please 
mark the line to indicate your overall 
impression of this experience/these 
experiences? 
 
Negative Neutral Positive 
   
 
16. Are you now attending sessions with a 
qualified mental health professional (i.e., 
counselor, social worker, psychologist, 
psychiatrist, therapist)?  
 
  No    Yes 
 
17. If you answered yes in the previous 
question, please mark the line to indicate 
how helpful you find this 
experience/these experiences? 
 
Very Unhelpful  Neutral Very helpful 
   
 
18. If you answered yes in the previous 
question, please mark the line to indicate 
your overall impression of this 
experience/these experiences? 
 
Negative  Neutral Positive 
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Appendix B 
 
Directions: Please take a moment to read the following passage.  
 
Jordan has not been feeling normal over the last three months. Jordan has begun to feel sad more 
days than not and has been increasingly short-tempered with friends and family. Jordan no 
longer engages with things that had been sources of stress relief, comfort, or excitement. Lately, 
Jordan’s sleep has not been as restful despite lasting for up to 14-hours in a single day. Some of 
Jordan’s responsibilities have begun to slip as a result of the increase in sleep, and Jordan no 
longer eats more than one meal per day. Having tried everything people have suggested, and 
noticing the increasingly limited relief provided by staying busy with work and trying to spend 
more time with friends, Jordan is not sure what else to do. Jordan is beginning to feel hopeless 
that the current circumstances will never change. Jordan has always had self-doubts, but the self-
doubt has become harsh self-criticism as a result of all of these present challenges. 
 
 
1. Would you consider Jordan to be depressed? Please mark the box which corresponds to your 
impression. 
 
     Yes, Jordan is depressed. 
 
     No, Jordan is not depressed.  
 
2. If yes, please indicate how severe you consider Jordan’s depression? 
 
not at all 
severe 
     extremely 
severe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Direction: Please take some time to imagine that you are in Jordan’s position.  
 
Condition 1: 
 
3. How likely are you to actively engage in treatment with a qualified mental-health professional 
(i.e., counselor, social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, therapist)? Please circle the number 
corresponding to your answer on the continuum below. 
 
not at all 
likely 
     extremely 
likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Condition 2: 
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3. How might you choose to respond to the situation in which you find yourself? Please mark the 
box next to the course of action you want to take. 
 
   Intentionally engage more with free activities such as working longer hours, exercising more, 
spending time with friends, or activities that bring pleasure. I know that these activities might 
provide me with temporary relief and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns. 
 
   Intentionally engage with a qualified mental-health professional (i.e., counselor, social 
worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, therapist), free of charge. I know that this activity might 
provide me with temporary relief and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns.  
 
 
4. Given your decision, how likely are you to actively engage in treatment with a qualified 
mental-health professional (i.e., counselor, social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, 
therapist)? Please circle the number corresponding to your answer on the continuum below. 
 
not at all 
likely 
     extremely 
likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Condition 3: 
 
3. How might you choose to respond to the situation in which you find yourself? Please mark the 
box next to the course of action you want to take. 
 
   Intentionally engage more with free activities such as working longer hours, exercising more, 
spending time with friends, or activities that bring pleasure. I know that these activities might 
provide me with temporary relief and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns. 
 
   Intentionally engage with a confidante without formal therapy training (i.e., close friend, 
family member, significant other, religious figure), free of charge. I know that this activity 
might provide me with temporary relief and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns.  
 
   Intentionally engage with a qualified mental-health professional (i.e., counselor, social 
worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, therapist), free of charge. I know that this activity might 
provide me with temporary relief and may not offer long-term benefits to my concerns.  
 
4. Given your decision, how likely are you to actively engage in treatment with a qualified 
mental-health professional (i.e., counselor, social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, 
therapist)? Please circle the number corresponding to your answer on the continuum below. 
 
not at all 
likely 
     extremely 
likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Figure 1. Final path model for the study wherein Stigma = total score SSOSHS, S-I = score of 
intuition subscale SSTS, S-R = score of rational subscale SSTS, R-I = score of intuition subscale 
REI, R-R = score of rational subscale REI, AHS = total score AHS, CFI = total score CFI, AAQ 
= total score AAQ-II, Tx = self-reported likelihood of engaging QMHP, IU = score of 
intolerance of uncertainty subscale, IA = score of intolerance of ambiguity subscale, IF = score 
of intolerance of frustration subscale, IPD = score of intolerance of physical discomfort subscale, 
INE = score of intolerance of negative emotion subscale. For clarity, model covariance 
relationships are not depicted. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.   
 
